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Resumen
Esta tesis estudia las transacciones de una muestra grande de inversores institucionales de EE.UU.
y examina el rol de este sub-grupo de inversores en el fomento de mercados ma´s eficientes. El
primer cap´ıtulo estudia la existencia de un v´ınculo directo entre los inversores institucionales y los
co-movimientos de la liquidez observados en los mercados bursa´tiles. A diferencia de otros estu-
dios que emplean diferentes proxies para el comercio agregado institucional, este trabajo utiliza una
base de datos distribuida por ANcerno Ltda. que provee datos de alta frecuencia de transacciones
institucionales. La evidencia emp´ırica sugiere que los co-movimientos de la liquidez aumentan con
la actividad comercial institucional a nivel agregado. Los resultados de las negociaciones bursa´tiles
institucionales para pares de acciones sugieren que esta relacio´n es una consecuencia de la correlacio´n
en las transacciones. Los resultados son robustos a diferentes especificaciones, formas funcionales y
sub-muestras basadas en caracter´ısticas de las acciones y periodos de tiempo. Adema´s, utilizando
el esca´ndalo de los fondos mutuos de 2003, se observa alguna evidencia de un v´ınculo causal entre
la co-variacio´n de la liquidez y las operaciones comerciales institucionales a nivel agregado. El se-
gundo cap´ıtulo investiga las fuentes de la relacio´n contempora´nea entre los cambios de propiedad
institucional y los retornos trimestrales, examinando la relacio´n transversal diaria e intradiaria entre
retornos y desequilibrios institucionales de oferta-demanda. Los hallazgos emp´ıricos sugieren que la
relacio´n contempora´nea trimestral (diaria) esta´ determinada principalmente por inversores institu-
cionales siguiendo los movimientos intra-trimestrales (intra-diarios). No se encuentra evidencia que
apoye la habilidad de los inversores institucionales para predecir retornos intra-trimestrales (intra-
diarios). De otro lado, el comercio institucional de momentum de corto plazo no parece tener un
efecto desestabilizador en los precios de los activos. El tercer cap´ıtulo brinda evidencia sobre el
comportamiento institucional de manada en el corto plazo. En el estudio se encuentra una evidencia
de´bil de comportamiento de manada, lo cual es consistente con los resultados trimestrales encon-
trados en otros art´ıculos. Adema´s, en concordancia con la literatura previa, los resultados sugieren
que el comportamiento de manada desde el lado de la demanda tiene un efecto estabilizador sobre
los precios, mientras que, desde el lado de la oferta, tiene un efecto desestabilizador. Finalmente, la
persistencia en el comportamiento institucional de manada es un predictor fuerte de la reversio´n de
los retornos.
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Abstract
This thesis studies the trading activities for a large sample of the U.S. institutional investors and
examines the role played by this sub-group of investors in promoting more efficient markets. The first
chapter addresses the question of whether there is a direct link between institutional trading activities
and liquidity co-movement observed in equity markets. Unlike the previous studies that employ
different proxies for the aggregate institutional trading, I use a proprietary database distributed by
ANcerno Ltd., that provides high-frequency institutional transaction data. The empirical evidence
suggests that commonality in liquidity increases with the aggregate institutional trading activity.
The results of common institutional trading for pairs of stocks suggest that this relationship is a
consequence of correlated trading . The findings are robust to different specifications, functional
forms and sub-samples based on stock characteristics and time periods. Furthermore, using the
mutual fund scandal of 2003, I find some evidence of causal link between commonality in liquidity and
institutional trading activity. The second chapter investigates the sources of the contemporaneous
relation between the changes in institutional ownership and returns found at quarterly intervals by
examining the daily and intradaily cross-sectional relation between institutional buy-sell imbalances
and returns. The empirical findings suggest that the quarterly (daily) contemporaneous relation
is mainly driven by institutional investors following the intra-quarter (intradaily) price movements.
I do not find any evidence to support the institutional investors’ ability to predict intra-quarter
(intradaily) returns. Additionally, the short-term institutional momentum trading doesn’t does not
seem to have a destabilizing effect on prices. The third chapter provides empirical evidence on the
short-term institutional herding. I document a weak evidence of weekly institutional herding, which
is consistent with the quarterly results found in the previous studies. Moreover, in accordance to
the the extant literature, I find that buy-side herding has a stabilizing effect on prices, while the
sell-side herding affects the prices in a destabilizing manner. Finally, I find that the persistence in
institutional herding is a strong predictor of return reversals.
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1.1 Introduction and Summary
The key role of the modern capital markets is to facilitate the transfer of funds between firms seeking
for financing and fund savers. This main function is carried out by the ease of trading different asset
classes, thus helping to share and diversify risk among different market participants. Another key
feature of the modern financial markets is the interaction between companies rising capital and insti-
tutional investors that manage a growing pool of assets. Most household investors choose to invest in
mutual funds, pension funds, or retirement products as their main investment vehicle to minimize the
cost of information search and other market frictions. In the United States, for example, traditional
institutional investors such as, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds
account for over 50% of equity ownership for firms listed on Nyse, Nasdaq, and the Amex exchanges
(Federal Reserve Board, 2011). The fact that institutional investments account for such a substan-
tial amount of the U.S. equities and that institutional trading constitutes the main part of the daily
trading volume may have a crucial impact on the quality of financial markets. Both the importance
of market quality for regulators and other market participants and the growing role of institutional
investments motivate this dissertation. In particular, it uses actual institutional transaction data to
empirically investigate whether institutional trading activity can explain commonality in liquidity,
examine the short-term institutional herding and the impact of short-term herding as well as the
persistence in institutional herding on asset prices, and to investigate the daily and intradaily relation
between institutional imbalances and returns.
There is a vast literature in finance devoted to examining the growth of institutional sharehold-
ings, the increasingly influential role of institutional investors in financial markets and their impact
on firm policies. Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano (2005) investigate the growth of equity ownership in
mutual fund industry in 57 countries. Institutional preference for certain stock characteristics and
the impact of these preferences on prices are studied in (e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992; Falkenstein,
1996; Gompers and Metrick, 2001; Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Bennett et al., 2003; Ferreira and
Matos, 2008). Moreover, there is an extensive work devoted to analyzing the performance of mutual
funds and pension funds (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1992, 1993; Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers,
1995; Carhart, 1997; Blake, Lehmann, and Timmermann, 1999; Wermers, 2000; Barras, Scaillet,
and Wermers, 2010). Institutional investors also have a strong influence on firm policies through
corporate governance by monitoring the managers through direct actions or ”voting with their feet.”
A series of studies investigate the impact of institutional investors on firms’ corporate governance
(e.g., Smith (1996), Wahal (1996), Bushee (2001), Abarbanell, Bushee, and Raedy (2003), Gillan
and Starks (2003), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003), Almazan, Hartzell,
and Starks (2005), Chen, Harford, and Li (2007))
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the impact of institutional investments on market
efficiency. The thesis employs a unique database of high frequency institutional transactional data.
The data, obtained from ANcerno Ltd. a transaction costs analyst, provide a unique opportunity
to examine various hypotheses regarding the influence of institutional investors on market quality.
The ANcerno data contains detailed information about 1142 institutional clients including money
managers, pension plan sponsors and brokerage companies, they identify exact date and execution
price of each transaction, number of traded shares, an indicator whether the transaction is buy or
sell, a unique identifier for each institution, and a unique stock identifier. The data allow us to
provide empirical evidence on the impact of institutional trading activity on market-wide liquidity
shocks, short-term institutional herding and its impact on prices, and the daily relation between
institutional trading activity and returns.
The second chapter investigates the role of institutional trading activity in explaining liquidity
comovements observed in equity markets, a direct link between institutional activity and common-
ality in liquidity. Commonality in liquidity refers to the existence of common underlying factors
affecting the liquidity of individual stocks. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) are the first
to provide empirical evidence on the existence of stock liquidity covariation with the market- and
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industry-wide liquidity. Following the work of Chordia et al. (2000), there have been a large number
of empirical studies providing evidence on the existence of liquidity commonality not only in the U.S.
markets, but also around the world as well as across different samples and time periods. However,
the sources and the economic mechanism behind the commonality in liquidity has received less at-
tention. Although the literature investigates two main sources of commonality in liquidity, that is,
supply-side of and demand-side for liquidity, the primary goal of this chapter is to shed more light
on the demand-side explanation of the liquidity commonality. In particular, the chapter examines
whether there is a direct link between institutional trading activity and liquidity comovements using
actual institutional transactional data. The chapter derives implications from the herding literature
and explains the main results in the context of correlated trading by institutional investors due to
their tendency to trade on common information, liquidity shocks, or herding behavior. We find
strong evidence that institutional trading is an important source of commonality in liquidity, and
that commonality in liquidity increases with institutional trading activity. These results are not
specific to stock characteristics (i.e. firm size and liquidity level) or driven by the endogeneity of
institutional stock holdings and are robust to different sub-samples based on firm size, liquidity level,
and time periods. To examine whether the association between liquidity covariation and institutional
trading is due to the correlated trading among institutional investors, we also connect pairs of stocks
through the number of common institutions trading the pair. The result of this analysis indicates
that the mechanism of liquidity covariation is the correlated trading across institutions. Finally,
results from the natural experiment of the mutual fund scandal in 2003 are suggestive of a causal
effect of institutional activity on commonality in liquidity, although for the largest and most liquid
securities.
The third chapter investigates the relation between institutional trading activity and returns,
both at daily and intradaily horizons. In the United States, institutional investors are only required
to report their equity shareholdings at quarterly frequency, hence, most of the previous studies use
changes in institutional ownership to proxy for institutional trading activity. Using quarterly data
the previous studies show that changes in institutional ownership are strongly autocorrelated, posi-
tively correlated with next period returns, and the changes in institutional ownership appear to be
positively correlated with past returns. These findings are interpreted as follows: (1) institutions
trade persistently; (2) on average, institutional trades are profitable: (3) institutional investors are
momentum traders. Furthermore, there is a strong positive relation between changes in institutional
shareholdings and same period returns (quarterly or yearly). However, it is hard to interpret this
relation because institutions can move prices in the direction of their trades, react to price move-
ments within the quarter, and can predict short term stock returns. The ideal way to get a clear
understanding of institutional trading patterns is by using changes in institutional ownership as
they occur. Using high frequency institutional transaction data, chapter 3 investigates the potential
sources of the contemporaneous relation documented at quarterly level and examines the short-term
relationship between returns and institutional imbalances. I find a strong positive contemporaneous
relationship between institutional imbalances and returns at a daily level. Institutional imbalances
follow prior day’s returns, a one standard deviation increase in daily returns are associated with
0.04 increase in institutional buy-sell imbalances in the following day. I find no evidence that insti-
tutional imbalances predict short-term future returns. Contemporaneously, institutions tend to sell
loser stocks more often than the winners, however, they buy prior day’s winners more than selling
prior day’s losers. The intradaily analysis shows that the primary sources of the daily contempora-
neous relation between changes in institutional ownership and returns is the institutional feedback
trading, but not the intradaily returns predictability.
Institutional investors are also accused of focusing excessively on the short-term trading strategies,
and that they tend to take positions on the same side of the market for the same stocks in a
given period in a way that is unrelated to fundamentals. These actions may have a destabilizing
impact by increasing the volatility of financial markets and force firms to focus on short-term more
than long-term strategies. However, if institutions form the herd by trading on information will
enhance the efficiency of market prices by accelerating the adjustment of new information into prices.
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Therefore, the fourth chapter is devoted to exploring short-term institutional herding and the impact
of institutional herding as well as the persistence in institutional herding on security prices. Although
there is a rich theoretical literature providing various explanation for why institutional investors
might engage in herding behavior, the empirical evidence on herding behavior by institutions is at best
mixed. The main goal of this chapter is to provide empirical evidence and to shed more light on short-
term institutional herding and its impact on prices. Consistent with the results found at quarterly
horizon in Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Wermers (1999), I find weak evidence of institutional herding
at weekly frequency. The overall level of weekly institutional herding of 2.5% suggests that out of
100 institutions, there are roughly two more institutions on the same side of the market more than
what would be expected if they trade randomly and independently. Both institutional buy and sell
herding affect returns differently. While returns continuation is followed institutional buy herding,
reversals are observed following institutional sell herding. Consistent with the long-term findings
in Dasgupta et al. (2011), I find that persistence in institutional herding over multiple weeks is
associated to return reversals after a period of about eight weeks.
The thesis uses a high-frequency proprietary database of institutional transactions to examine
the influence of institutional investments on market efficiency. The thesis contributes to the extant
literature on institutional investments in three ways. First, it provides direct link between institu-
tional trading activity and commonality in liquidity; the empirical findings suggest that liquidity
comovement increases with the trading activity of institutional investors. Second, it provides em-
pirical evidence on the short-term institutional herding and its impact on prices. Although I find
weak evidence of short-term institutional herding, I find strong evidence on the price impact of in-
stitutional herding. Third, the thesis also provides empirical evidence on the daily and intradaily
relation between the aggregate institutional trading and returns.
Chapter 2
Institutional Investment and
Commonality in Liquidity:
Evidence from Transaction Data
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2.1 Introduction
In 1965, institutional investors held 16.2% of U.S. equities. That percentage increased to 50.2% in
2010, according to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2011). The fact that in-
stitutional investors are managing such a substantial share of the U.S. equity market has important
potential consequences for price formation and liquidity. In this chapter, we use institutional in-
vestors’ transaction data to investigate whether institutional investors’ trading activities can explain
observed market-wide liquidity shocks.
Asset liquidity, that is, the ability to trade large quantities rapidly, at a low cost, and with little
price impact, is of paramount importance to market participants. A number of studies document
empirical evidence suggesting that investors require a compensation to invest in less liquid assets (see,
e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Amihud, 2002). But investors also care about how an asset’s
liquidity moves together with the liquidity of other stocks, i.e., commonality in liquidity. To the
extent that liquidity risk cannot be fully diversified, investors require a risk premium for investing
in a stock whose liquidity decreases precisely when liquidity is most needed, that is, in periods of
liquidity dry-ups (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Korajczyk and Sadka,
2008). The recent financial crisis has evidenced the potential effects of market-wide liquidity dry-ups
on the ability of financial intermediaries to provide liquidity to the real sector (Cornett et al., 2011).
Although time-variation in market liquidity is well documented in the literature (Chordia et al.,
2000; Hasbrouck and Seppi, 2001), the mechanism through which commonality in liquidity arises in
stock markets is still not fully understood. Understanding how commonality in liquidity arises in
financial markets could help investors better manage liquidity risk. Moreover, it would help market
designers and regulators set rules that minimize the probability of liquidity dry-ups.
Two main sources of commonality in liquidity have been investigated in the literature. Coughenour
and Saad (2004), Hameed et al. (2010), Comerton-Forde et al. (2010) and Brunnermeier and Ped-
ersen (2009) posit that market-wide liquidity fluctuations are the consequence of the existence of
market participants who provide liquidity to many assets. For instance, access to capital by market
makers, hedge funds, and investment banks, may vary through time. Such variations affect their
ability to provide liquidity and, to the extent that financial intermediaries operate in many assets
simultaneously, they could cause liquidity comovement. As opposed to the supply-side explanation,
other authors have argued in favor of a demand-side explanation. Institutional investors trade as
a response to liquidity shocks or to the arrival of new information. For example, when open-end
mutual funds experience net outflows of money, they are often forced to liquidate their positions to
meet redemptions. To the extent that these motives for trading affect a large number of institutional
investors at the same time, there will be an increase in the demand for liquidity for the assets traded
by those institutions, which will in turn affect the liquidity of the traded assets (Chordia et al.,
2000). Correlated trading across assets will be strengthened if different institutions concentrate their
trades on the same assets due, for instance, to these institutions sharing similar investment styles.
Karolyi et al. (2012) exploit the heterogeneity in market characteristics across stock exchanges to
disentangle the plausibility of these competing views on the origin of commonality in liquidity and
conclude that the empirical evidence is more consistent with the demand-side explanation: While
commonality in liquidity is greater in countries with more correlated trading activity, as proxied by
stock turnover, it does not increase in times when financial intermediaries are more likely to hit their
capital constraints.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between institutional investors’
trading and commonality in liquidity using data on actual institutional investors’ trades. Previous
attempts to establish a link between institutional investors’ trading activity and commonality in
liquidity have suffered from lack of publicly available institutional trading data and have relied on
various proxies for institutional trading activity. Kamara et al. (2008) use institutional ownership
and index inclusion to proxy for institutional trading. Karolyi et al. (2012) use stock turnover
to proxy for institutional trades. These proxies for institutional trading suffer from a number of
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limitations. Turnover does not distinguish between trading by institutions and trading by retail
investors. While index inclusion (or exclusion) could be a good proxy for institutional trading,
changes in the composition of an index are sparse and do not measure appropriately the volume of
institutional investor trading activity or the correlation in trading across institutions.
Our work builds on the study of Koch et al. (2012), who use a stock’s mutual fund ownership,
defined as the percentage of a firm’s shares outstanding held by mutual funds, as well as quarterly
changes in mutual fund ownership, to proxy for the amount of institutional investors’ trading in the
stock. Mutual fund ownership overcomes the limitations of the proxies described above, but it is also
an imperfect proxy for institutional trading. Two firms with similar fractions of their shares held by
institutional investors could experience very different trading activity if the institutions that invest
in those companies differ in the frequency and size of their trades. Moreover, mutual fund ownership
is likely to be associated with stock characteristics reflecting the portfolio choices of institutional
investors, which may bias the results of the analysis if those characteristics are correlated with the
outcome variable. Although changes in mutual funds’ holdings come closest to actual institutional
trading activity, this proxy does not capture round trip trades between two consecutive portfolio
disclosure dates. The problem becomes more severe if holdings are reported only at the quarterly
frequency. The dangers of using low-frequency holdings data to proxy for mutual funds’ trading
activity are best illustrated in a recent study by Elton et al. (2010), who revisit some well known
hypotheses, such as momentum trading, tax-motivated trading, window dressing, and tournament
behavior, using holdings data observed at the monthly frequency instead of quarterly or semi-annual
holdings data.
The database we employ in this dissertation, distributed by ANcerno Ltd., a private transaction
costs analyst, contains detailed information on institutional transactions that are responsible for
nearly 8% of the total volume in CRSP in each year of our sample period.1 This dataset overcomes
many of the limitations of previously employed proxies: It distinguishes between institutional and
retail investors’ trades; It enables us to measure the degree of correlated trading across institutions;
And it does not ignore round-trip transactions.
We replicate the study of Koch et al. (2012) using institutional investors’ trades data instead
of holdings data. However, we control for institutional ownership to account for potential portfolio
choice effects. We also control for total trading volume in order to distinguish institutional trading
activity from that of retail investors. As mentioned above, commonality in liquidity should be
stronger when different institutional investors trade the same assets. To account for correlated
trading across institutional investors, we follow the approach of Anto´n and Polk (2014), who find
that stocks that are held by a larger number of common funds (“connected” stocks) exhibit higher
excess comovement in returns. Analogously, we study whether the degree of liquidity comovement
between two stocks is associated with the number of common institutions trading in both stocks.
Finally, although we deal with the potential endogeneity of institutional portfolio choices by explicitly
controlling for institutional ownership, the decision of which stocks to trade is also endogenous.
Again, building on Anto´n and Polk (2014), we propose to exploit the mutual fund late trading and
market timing scandal of 2003, which forced some families of funds to liquidate their positions, as an
exogenous source of variation in institutional trading to study its effect on commonality in liquidity.
Our results suggest that institutional investor trading explains commonality in liquidity. The
empirical evidence reveals a significant positive relationship between commonality in liquidity and
institutional investor trading activity. Our findings are not driven by the endogeneity of institutional
ownership or other observable stock characteristics and are robust to different empirical specifica-
tions. Moreover, the results of the analysis of connected stocks are consistent with the idea that
the mechanism for commonality in liquidity is correlated trading across institutions. Finally, the
evidence from the 2003 mutual fund scandal is suggestive of a causal effect of institutional trading
1The ANcerno trade data have been used by academic researcher and produced various studies including Goldstein,
Irvine, Kandel, and Wiener (2009), Chemmanur, He, and Hu (2009), Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett (2011), Puckett
and Yan (2011), Anand, Irvine, Puckett, and Venkataraman (2012), and Hu, McLean, Pontiff, and Wang (2010).
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on liquidity comovement, although only for the largest and the most liquid stocks.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we develop our main
hypotheses and explain the methodology used to test the hypotheses. The data are described in
Section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents evidence of the relationship between commonality in liquidity and
institutional trading activity. In Section 2.5, we study the relationship between common institutional
trading and liquidity co-variation. Section 2.6 presents the results of our identification analysis.
Robustness tests are included in Section 2.7. We conclude the chapter in Section 2.8.
2.2 Hypotheses and Methodology
2.2.1 Hypotheses
Correlated trading across assets can arise if institutions’ information-based strategies are correlated,
as institutional investors react to the same information or as institutional investors infer information
from the observed trading activity of others. Also, correlated trading can be the consequence of
institutions responding to common liquidity shocks. In either case, if institutional investors trade
at the same time and in the same direction, the increase in the demand for liquidity could result in
liquidity comovement (Chordia et al., 2000). Consistently with this reasoning, our first hypothesis
captures the idea that commonality in liquidity should be more prevalent among stocks with a higher
level of institutional trading activity.
Hypothesis 1: Stocks that are highly traded by institutional investors exhibit com-
monality in liquidity .
For institutional trading to cause liquidity commonality, institutions must demand liquidity at
the same time across assets. When the shocks that motivate institutions’ trades affect a larger
number of institutions, we would expect an increase in the correlation of trading across institutions
and therefore, more liquidity commonality among assets. For example, the mutual fund sector often
experiences large market-wide inflows or outflows of money, which result in many funds demanding
liquidity at the same time. This is so because mutual funds experiencing large outflows are often
forced to liquidate positions in assets to meet redemptions as a consequence of the institutional
constraints they face (Coval and Stafford, 2007; Jotikasthira et al., 2012; Zhang, 2010). Similarly,
a mutual fund experiencing large inflows often must increase its existing positions to avoid large
cash balances (Pollet and Wilson, 2008). In either case, many institutions will be forced to demand
liquidity at the same time and this will affect market-wide asset liquidity. Therefore, we would expect
the association between institutional trading and commonality in liquidity to be higher in periods of
extreme aggregate flows of money into and out of mutual funds.
Hypothesis 2a: The effect of institutional investors’ trading activity on commonality
in liquidity is stronger in periods of large aggregate flows into/out of mutual funds.
It could be argued that mutual funds are better able to cope with money inflows than outflows.
After all, increasing cash holdings as a response to inflows may be detrimental to fund performance
but is feasible, whereas failing to redeem shares or borrowing is not an option for mutual funds facing
outflows. While mutual funds could split their purchases and distribute them through time when
facing money inflows, they will often be forced to liquidate positions when experiencing outflows.
Therefore, we also consider the following variant of Hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2b: The effect of institutional investors’ trading activity on commonality
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in liquidity is stronger in periods of flows of money out of mutual funds.
While we expect all assets traded by institutions to experience correlated trading, this correlation
will be higher if assets are traded by the same institutions. Anto´n and Polk (2014) document a
positive association between comovement of stock returns and the degree of connectedness between
stocks through common mutual fund ownership. In particular, they forecast the cross-sectional
variation in return correlation using the degree of shared ownership or the number of funds that hold
a pair of stocks i and j in their portfolios: Pairs of stocks that are connected in this fashion exhibit
more price comovement controlling for stock characteristics. Following the same reasoning and using
the same approach, we hypothesize that stock connectedness through institutional trading explains
commonality in liquidity.
Hypothesis 3: Commonality in liquidity is stronger among stocks that are connected
through common institutional trading .
2.2.2 Variable Definitions
Our primary measure of stock-level institutional trading is based on the fraction of firm i’s shares
traded by all institutions in our sample on day d. Specifically, for each stock, we construct a daily
measure of aggregate institutional investor trading
Daily ITradei,d =
J∑
j=1
sharestradedi,j,d
shrouti,d
(2.1)
where sharestradedi,j,d is the number of shares traded (buy and sell) in stock i by institution j on
day d, shrouti,d is the total number of shares outstanding of stock i on day d. In our analysis we
use the mean value of Daily ITradei,d in quarter t, which we denote by ITradei,t.
We follow the literature and use Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure to proxy for stock daily
illiquidity. The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is computed as the absolute value of stock i’s
return on day d divided by the dollar volume of trading in stock i on that day.2
illiqi,d =
| ri,d |
| dvoli,d | (2.2)
We use Amihud illiquidity measure in our study in two ways. First, we employ the change in
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure to estimate loadings of stock liquidity on market-wide liquidity
as well as pair-wise liquidity comovement. Second, we add the level of Amihud illiquidity measure
as an additional control in many specifications to account for the possible effect of liquidity level on
commonality in liquidity. In particular, changes in Amihud illiquidity are computed as
4illiqi,d = ln
[
illiqi,d
illiqi,d−1
]
(2.3)
where ri,d is the return for stock i in day d and dvoli,d is the dollar volume for stock i in day d.
2See e.g., Hasbrouck (2009) and Goyenko et al. (2009) for a summary of the literature on the performance of
Amihud (2002) measure.
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2.2.3 Testing Methodology
To test whether stocks with high institutional trading activity exhibit commonality in liquidity, we
follow a two-step approach similar to that used by Coughenour and Saad (2004) and Koch et al.
(2012). In the first step, we estimate the individual stock liquidity co-variation with the liquidity of
a portfolio of stocks with high institutional trading activity (value of ITrade in the top quartile of
the cross-sectional distribution). In the second step, we test whether liquidity co-variation between
individual stocks and the high ITrade portfolio is stronger among firms with high institutional
trading.
More specifically, for each firm i and quarter t in our sample, we run a time series regression of
daily changes in the Amihud illiquidity measure on the illiquidity of two portfolios, a high institutional
trading portfolio containing all stocks in the top quartile of institutional trading activity as sorted
at the end of the prior quarter and a market portfolio containing all stocks:
4illiqi,d = αi,t + βHI,i,t 4 illiqITrade,d + βmkt,i,t 4 illiqmkt,d + δcontrols+ εi,d (2.4)
We follow Chordia et al. (2000) and include as controls one lead and one lag changes in the two
portfolio illiquidity variables, contemporaneous firm return squared, and lead, lag, and contempo-
raneous market returns. The squared stock return is included to proxy for volatility, which could
be associated with liquidity. As in Chordia et al. (2000), for each regression we exclude firm i from
the market portfolio as well as from the high institutional trading portfolio. To minimize the effect
of outliers, we winsorize observations that are in the top and bottom 1% of the stock’s liquidity
distribution.
Our first hypothesis is that the liquidity of stocks with high levels of institutional investor trading
activity covaries more with that of other highly traded stocks. To test this hypothesis, we study
whether estimated loadings on the high institutional trading portfolio are positively related to the
level of institutional investors’ trading in the cross section of stocks. Moreover, we regress βHI
against the previous quarter institutional investors level of correlated trading measure, ITradei,t−1,
controlling for total market trading activity, MTradei,t−1 computed as the total CRSP volume for
stock i divided by total shares outstanding, firm size and average illiquidity:
βHI,i,t = α+ b1ITradei,t−1 + b2MTradei,t−1 + b3ln(sizei,t−1) + b4illiq(avg)i,t−1 + εi,t (2.5)
Hypothesis 2a predicts that the impact of institutional investors’ trades will be greater in periods
of high absolute flows. We follow Koch et al. (2012) and compute aggregate mutual fund flows for
each quarter using data from CRSP Mutual Fund Survivorship Bias Database. In particular, we
calculate net fund flows into equity mutual funds, and then divided this amount by the total market
value at the beginning of the quarter. From the resulting time series, we calculate a dummy variable,
extremeflow, that equals one if aggregate flows in a quarter are in the top or bottom 10% of the
distribution of quarterly flows in our sample period, and zero otherwise. Net flows are signed, so the
bottom (top) 10% is comprised of the largest net outflow (inflow) quarters. To test Hypothesis 2b,
we create another dummy variable, negflow, that equals one if aggregate flows are negative, and
zero otherwise. Each of these dummy variables is interacted with ITradei,t−1 and MTradei,t−1 and
included in the regression specifications.
To test our third Hypothesis, we follow the approach proposed by Anto´n and Polk (2014) and
look at pairs of stocks connected through common institutional trading. More specifically, we study
whether the number of institutional investors trading simultaneously in two stocks predicts the
pair-wise liquidity co-variation between the stocks, controlling for similarity in industry, size, book-
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to-market ratio, and momentum characteristics. In particular, we estimate
4illiqi,t+1 4 illiqj,t+1 = α+ βfF ∗ij,t + βsDIFF SIZE∗ij,t + βbDIFF BEME∗ij,t (2.6)
+ βmDIFF MOM
∗
ij,t + βkNUM SIC
∗
ij,t + βs1SIZE1
∗
ij,t
+ βs2SIZE2
∗
ij,t + βs12SIZE1SIZE2
∗
ij,t + εij,t
where Fij,t is the number of institutions that trade both stock i and j on month t. As in Anto´n
and Polk (2014) for each cross section, we calculate the normalized rank transformation of Fij,t (so
the variable has zero mean and unit standard deviation), which we denote as F ∗ij,t. To control for
commonality in liquidity induced by similar stock characteristics, we follow Anto´n and Polk (2014)
and for each month we first calculate every stock’s percentile ranking on a particular characteristic.
The measures of similarity, DIFF SIZE, DIFF BEME, and DIFF MOM , are just the negative
of the absolute difference in percentile ranking across a pair for a particular characteristic: size,
book-to-market, and momentum, respectively. To capture similarity in industry, we use the same
approach as Anto´n and Polk (2014) and compute the number of consecutive SIC digits that are equal
for a given pair, NUM SIC. Similar to our main measure of institutional connectedness, the nor-
malized rank transformation of these variables is used, which we denote with an asterisk superscript.
As institutional trading is correlated with size, we add the normalized rank transformation of the
percentile firm size as an additional controls, SIZE1 and SIZE2 (where the larger firm in the pair
is labeled as the first stock), and the interaction between the two market capitalization percentile
rankings.
We estimate these loadings using Fama and McBeth (1973) approach. We demean and normalize
all the independent variables in the cross-section to have a unit standard deviation to facilitate the
interpretation and that the intercept α measures the average cross-sectional effect. We compute the
Newey-West standard errors so that the Fama-MacBeth estimates account for the autocorrelation
up to four lags.
2.3 Data
Institutional transaction order-level data are obtained from ANcerno Limited for the period from
January 1, 1999 through September 30, 2011. ANcerno is a leading consulting firm that provides
institutional investors with transaction cost analysis and trading technology services. ANcerno data
cover the equity transactions of ANcerno’ clients, a large number of institutional investors including
pension plan sponsors as well as institutional money managers. The dataset offers potential ad-
vantages in comparison to other high-frequency trading data that make them perfectly suitable for
examining institutional investor trading and commonality in liquidity relationship. Each observa-
tion in the dataset provides a unique ANcerno client identification code, a unique stock identification
code, stockkey as well as cusip, and ticker, execution price, the transaction price, number of shares
executed, date and time stamps for the order, and whether the trade is a buy or sell. According to
ANcerno’s specialists, the database captures the entire history of all trades of ANcerno’s clients as
long as they remain in the sample. Since ANcerno is proprietary database, survivorship and selection
bias issues are potential concerns. While the data may suffer from selection bias, the survivorship
bias is not a concern according to Puckett and Yan (2011).
Summary statistics for ANcerno’s trade data and stock characteristics are reported in Table 2.1.
Panel A presents the full sample statistics. In aggregate, the sample incudes 1,142 institutions that
execute nearly 205 million trades associated with approximately 33 trillion dollars in trading volume.
2.3. Data 23
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics for ANcerno Institutional Trading Data and Stock Char-
acteristics
This table reports summary statistics of institutional trading data obtained from ANcerno Ltd. The sample
contains the trades of 1,142 institutions during the period from January 1, 1999 to September 30, 2011. The
sample includes stocks where ANcerno volume is less than or equal to the total daily trading volume as reported
in CRSP. Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the full sample of institutional trading data. Panel B reports
yearly sub-sample descriptive statistics. Panel C reports descriptive statistics for stocks traded by ANcerno
institutions. Our sample includes only common stocks (those with a share-code of 10 or 11 in CRSP). Amihud
illiquidity measure is calculated as the average of daily ratios between absolute return and dollar trading
volume. We compute stock characteristics each quarter. Market capitalization is as of the end of the previous
quarter. All other stock characteristics are measured based on the 12-month period until the end of the previous
quarter. Firm-size quintile breakpoints are computed for the stocks in our sample. We report the quarterly
cross sectional averages for all stock characteristics in each size-quantile.
No. No. No. Shares Dollar Ave. Shares Med. Shares Ave. Dollar Med. Dollar
Inst. Stocks Trades (mill.) Vol. (bill.) Vol. (bill.) Vol. per Tr. Vol. per Tr. Vol. per Tr. Vol. per Tr.
Panel A:
Full Sample 1142 7800 205.68 1110 32950 5395.65 300 160165.1 9396
Panel B:
By year
1999 379 4855 4.00 35 1550 8739 1600 388,477 58025
2000 370 4761 5.42 52 2320 9612 1500 427,977 54500
2001 398 4176 6.82 75 2270 11052 1400 332,664 38523
2002 424 3942 9.17 100 2390 10905 1300 260,799 30132
2003 401 3993 7.92 71 1750 8907 1020 220,640 27103
2004 404 4202 16.39 117 3320 7113 700 202,353 20361
2005 376 4050 14.75 94 2930 6399 400 198,372 13338
2006 399 4062 24.63 103 3270 4185 200 132,652 6526
2007 377 4114 31.02 103 3590 3323 100 115,614 4206
2008 333 3817 26.20 122 3450 4672 200 131,796 5961
2009 322 3693 21.00 102 2230 4839 255 106,310 5739
2010 308 3468 22.19 85 2310 3826 160 104,261 4605
2011 259 3331 16.18 51 1570 3142 145 96,935 4844
Panel C: Stock Characteristics
Turnover Market Capitalization Amihud Illiquidity No. Shares Traded Return
(%) ($billions) (in millions) (millions) (%)
Firm Size (quantile)
Small 211 0.37 0.0182 2.15 2
2 255 0.80 0.0043 3.60 3
3 275 1.54 0.0019 5.90 4
4 269 3.45 0.0008 10.40 3
Large 218 28.00 0.0002 33.70 3
Full Sample 245.6 6.83 0.0051 11.15 3
On average, ANcerno’s clients are responsible for almost 8% of CRSP dollar value of trading
volume throughout 1999 to 2011 of our sample period.3 Since total institutional investor trading
accounts for 80% of CRSP trading volume, we estimate that ANcerno clients are responsible for
10% of all institutional trading volume. Panel B reveals several notable time series patterns in the
trading of institutional investors in our sample. The number of institutions in the database peaks
in 2002 and declines towards the end of sample period. The overall number of stocks that ANcerno
clients trade declines from 4,855 in 1999 to 3,331 in 2011. The average dollar volume varies between
a maximum of $427,977 in 2000 and a minimum of $96,935 in 2011. The median dollar volume
ranges from $58,025 in 1999 to $4,206 in 2007.
To complement ANcerno trade data, we collect stock data, such as trading volume, prices, re-
turns, and number of shares outstanding from CRSP. Panel C of Table 2.1 reports the descriptive
statistics for the sample of stocks traded by ANcerno clients. We report the cross-sectional average
of stock characteristics for the full sample and by firm size quintile. The average market capital-
ization of securities traded by ANcerno institutions is $6.83 billion, while the mean illiquidity is
0.0051. Moreover, we report that our sample of stocks have average turnover of 245.6% per year.
In addition, we find that the average illiquidity of stocks in the bottom size quintile is 0.0182, while
3We follow Puckett and Yan (2011) and compute the fraction of trading volume by ANcerno’s clients to the trading
volume as reported by CRSP at the daily basis. Only common stocks (share code equal to 10 or 11) are included.
Moreover, all ANcerno trades are divided by two because every ANcerno client represent only one side of a trade.
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the corresponding number for stocks in the top size quintile is only 0.0002. Small stocks experience
an average trading volume of 2.15 (million) shares, while the large stocks’ average trading volume is
33.7 (million) shares.
Finally, for some of our tests, we use data on mutual fund total net assets from CRSP Survivorship
Bias-Free mutual fund database and equity holdings from Thomson Reuters.
To obtain the required data for our empirical analysis and minimize observations with errors, we
choose the following filtering criteria: (1) We delete all transactions if the order volume is greater
than the total volume as reported by CRSP on each of the execution date; (2) We follow Chordia
et al. (2000) and keep class A securities and exclude other categories such as shares of beneficial inter-
est, derivatives, closed-end investment companies, preferred stocks, warrants, American depositary
receipts, units, holdings and realty trusts, rights, and trusts; (3) We eliminate those shares where
the average stock price over the year is less than $2 and higher than $200. This is relevant for our
analysis because daily fluctuation in stock liquidity outside these price levels can be very high either
because these stocks are rarely traded, ticking size constraints, or price discreteness. To estimate
liquidity betas, we require a minimum of 40 observations per quarter. Finally, because some stocks
are traded only one quarter we also require a stock to be traded at least 4 consecutive quarters. Our
filtering criteria result in 3,297 firms in the sample.
2.4 Empirical Results
2.4.1 Institutional Investor Trading and Commonality in Liquidity
To test Hypothesis 1, we need to estimate liquidity betas from time series regressions of daily changes
in stock liquidity on the changes in liquidity of a portfolio of highly-traded stocks and the market
portfolio. Table 2.2 reports yearly average sample statistics for both the market and the high-
institutional-trading portfolios as well as the estimated coefficients of interest. The left-hand side of
Table 2.2 shows the yearly average of the liquidity beta coefficients with respect to the portfolio of
highly traded stocks, the percentage of beta coefficients that are positive, the percentage of coefficients
that are significant (at the 5% level), as well as a t-statistic on the sample of beta coefficients that
are significant in that year. The table also presents the average firm size, average illiquidity and the
number of stocks in both portfolios.
Time-series regression estimates reveal that an individual stock’s liquidity co-varies with the
liquidity of a portfolio of stocks that are highly traded by institutional investors, controlling for
information inducing commonality with market liquidity. However, the institutional-liquidity beta is
roughly one-half the size of the market-liquidity beta. We find that the magnitude and percentage of
positive institutional liquidity betas are lowest at the beginning of our sample and increase toward the
end of sample period, the opposite patterns are observed for market liquidity betas. It is interesting
to compare our results with those of Koch et al. (2012), who use the change in the Amihud (2002)
illiquidity measure (same as in our study) and the fraction of shares outstanding held by mutual
funds to proxy for correlated trading (we use actual institutional trades). As in Koch et al. (2012),
Table 2.2 shows that relatively few of the liquidity betas are significantly different from zero at the
5% level. This is probably due to short sample length of our time-series regressions.4 The signs and
significance of the commonality coefficients are also similar to those obtained in Koch et al. (2012).
While the full sample average of βHI in our sample is smaller, the degree of individual liquidity
4Both our estimates of the liquidity betas and those of Koch et al. (2012) differ from the estimates of Chordia
et al. (2000) and Coughenour and Saad (2004), who find larger fractions of statistically significant coefficients. The
fact that those studies use the full sample period rather than quarterly periods for the time-series regressions accounts
for the differences. In unreported results, for each stock we run the full sample time series regression and find that
63% of institutional investors liquidity beta are positive and 20% of these coefficients significantly different from zero
at the 5% level. On the other hand, 80% of market liquidity betas are positive with 33% being significantly different
from zero at the 5% level.
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variation explained is higher. As in Koch et al. (2012), on average, the firm size in the institutional
investor portfolio is smaller than that in the market portfolio, consistent with the findings of Bennett
et al. (2003), who document that in the recent years institutional investors have tended to increase the
weight of smaller and riskier stocks in their portfolios. Institutional trading on average has increased
over the whole sample of stocks through time. For the stocks in the top quartile of institutional
trading activity has increased from 0.14% in 1999 to 0.22% in the 2009. Stocks were more illiquid
in 1999 in comparison to 2011. The increase in liquidity is most notable among stocks highly traded
by institutional investors with average illiquidity lower than that of stocks in the market portfolio in
all years. This result indicates that institutional investors are attracted to liquid stocks, consistent
with findings of earlier studies (Falkenstein, 1996).
Table 2.2: Time Series Estimates of Liquidity Betas
This table reports summary statistics on liquidity betas with respect to a high institutional trading portfolio
and a market portfolio of NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks. The high institutional trading portfolio is comprised
of the stocks in the top quartile of institutional trading activity, ITrade, as ranked at the end of the previous
quarter. ITrade is the number of shares traded by all institutions divided by number of shares outstanding.
Liquidity betas are estimated by regressing for each quarter and each firm, the daily change in the firm’s
illiquidity (Amihud measure) on the daily changes in the value weighted illiquidity measure for a portfolio of
high institutional trading stocks and the market portfolio, as well as control variables. In each time series
regression the stock’s individual measure is removed from the market portfolio and the high ITrade portfolio.
The left (right) columns summarize the coefficient estimates for the high ITrade portfolio liquidity (market
portfolio liquidity). In each year, we record the average beta, the percentage of positive coefficients and the
percentage of coefficients that are significant at the 5% level, and we compute a t-statistic on the sample of
beta estimates that are positive and significant in that year. In addition, we report the average firm size and
the number of stocks in each portfolio.
HI ITrade Portfolio MKT Portfolio
R2 βHI %pos %sig tstat ITrade illiq Size #stocks βmkt %pos %sig tstat ITrade illiq Size #stocks
1999 0.32 -0.06 47 6 2.46 0.014 0.58 3.92 336 0.77 68 8 2.57 0.0076 0.65 11.40 810
2000 0.34 0.05 51 5 2.39 0.018 0.44 4.73 411 0.53 61 6 2.46 0.0100 0.53 12.00 914
2001 0.32 0.12 53 8 2.49 0.029 0.38 3.63 469 0.47 61 8 2.45 0.0137 0.48 8.89 1114
2002 0.34 0.11 52 7 2.53 0.029 0.44 2.61 573 0.59 61 7 2.50 0.0149 0.56 6.43 1356
2003 0.34 0.20 53 6 2.43 0.020 0.26 2.65 548 0.61 63 7 2.45 0.0103 0.35 6.87 1296
2004 0.32 0.07 52 7 2.40 0.028 0.19 2.49 738 0.70 65 8 2.45 0.0154 0.26 6.54 1628
2005 0.31 0.11 52 5 2.41 0.023 0.16 2.39 802 0.69 63 7 2.45 0.0127 0.22 6.71 1714
2006 0.32 0.18 53 5 2.40 0.021 0.13 2.57 858 0.62 60 6 2.43 0.0122 0.19 6.72 1845
2007 0.33 0.45 58 6 2.40 0.021 0.11 2.94 950 0.37 56 6 2.42 0.0125 0.17 6.83 1998
2008 0.37 0.09 52 5 2.33 0.024 0.25 2.53 861 0.57 61 6 2.40 0.0144 0.39 5.95 1829
2009 0.37 0.55 61 8 2.47 0.022 0.26 2.33 855 0.20 54 7 2.41 0.0130 0.49 4.65 1845
2010 0.36 0.36 59 8 2.50 0.018 0.16 2.79 909 0.47 60 8 2.50 0.0108 0.28 5.48 1949
2011 0.37 0.53 61 8 2.46 0.015 0.16 2.76 775 0.25 55 6 2.49 0.0091 0.25 6.28 1930
Full Sample 0.34 0.21 54 6 2.44 0.022 0.27 2.95 699 0.53 60.6 7 2.46 0.0120 0.37 7.29 1556
To test Hypothesis 1, we regress estimated βHI , our measure of commonality in liquidity, against
the prior quarter’s institutional trading ITradei,t−1 controlling for firm characteristics, such as size
and average illiquidity. In addition, we add time dummies and cluster the standard errors at the stock
level. Estimation results are reported in Panel A of Table 2.3. Column (1) of this table reports the
results of the full sample pooled OLS regression of βHI against institutional trading, time dummies
and total market trade. The coefficient on βHI is positive and statistically significant at conventional
significance levels, which suggests that stocks with high institutional trading activity exhibit strong
liquidity covariation.
Prior studies find that institutional investors select stocks based on characteristics that are corre-
lated with future liquidity (Del Guercio, 1996; Falkenstein, 1996). In column (2) we add firm size and
average illiquidity as additional controls. The coefficient on institutional investors’ correlated trad-
ing remains positive and highly significant and the magnitude is slightly higher than the estimated
coefficient without controls. This result is also economically significant: A one standard deviation
increase (0.10) in institutional investor trading is associated with a 0.08 increase in βHI , which equals
a 33% increase relative to its mean value. These findings are similar to those obtained by Koch et al.
(2012), who document that a one standard deviation increase in mutual fund ownership is associated
with a 0.08 increase in their liquidity beta, a 27% increase from its mean.
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One possible concern is whether our findings are driven by institutional investors’ preferences for
stock characteristics other than size and liquidity that could be correlated to commonality in liquidity.
To control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, we include firm fixed effects in Column (3).
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 2.3 use different assumptions on the structure of the error term: Column
(4) employs standard errors clustered at firm level and time level; and Column (5) reports the results
of Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions. Under all specifications, we find a positive relationship between
liquidity beta with respect to the high institutional investor portfolio and trading by institutional
investors. The relationship is both economically and statistically significant.
Koch, Ruenzi, and Starks (2012) provide empirical evidence that stocks with high mutual fund
ownership exhibit strong liquidity comovements. Institutional trading correlates with institutional
ownership which, in turn, captures endogenous institutional portfolio choices that could be related
to commonality in liquidity. To account for that possibility, we control for institutional ownership
in column (6). The results indicate that institutional ownership has explanatory power with respect
to commonality in liquidity even when our proxy for institutional trading is included among the
regressors. However, the association between our measure of institutional trading and liquidity
commonality is still large and highly significant, suggesting that both variables capture different
determinants of commonality in liquidity. A possible interpretation of this result is that institutional
ownership correlates with some institutions’ portfolio choice determinants that are associated with
liquidity commonality.
In Panel B of Table 2.3, we replace ITradei,t−1 with DITrade, a dummy variable that equals one
if institutional trading is in the top quartile in the prior quarter, and zero otherwise. The results
of Column (2) in Panel B indicate that stocks in the top quartile of institutional investor trading
in the previous quarter have a βHI in the following quarter that is 0.17 greater than those outside
the top quartile. This is a significant economic effect given the unconditional average of βHI is 0.24.
The estimated coefficient on this indicator variable is positive and statistically significant in all other
specifications, too.5
5In unreported results, we include the squared values of ITrade and MTrade as regressors. Our conclusions remain
unaltered
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Table 2.3: Relationship between Commonality in Liquidity and Institutional Trading
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of estimates of on selected stock characteristics measured
at the end of the previous quarter. βHI is estimated from time-series regressions of daily changes in liquidity
on changes in liquidity of a portfolio of stocks highly traded by institutions. ITrade is the number of shares
traded by institutions divided by number of shares outstanding, MTrade is the total volume for as reported in
CRSP, divided by the number of shares outstanding. illiq(avg) is the firm’s average Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure over the previous quarter. instown is the number of shares held by all institutional investors divided
by number of shares outstanding. ln(size) is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. Panel A uses the
standard measure of ITrade and Panel B uses a dummy equal to 1 if ITrade is in the top quartile in a given
quarter, and zero otherwise. Time dummies are included in columns (1) to (3). Standard errors are clustered by
firm in columns (1) to (4). Column (3) includes firm fixed effects. In column (4) standard errors are clustered
by quarters. Column (5) reports results from Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions.
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ITrade 54.66∗∗∗ 60.75∗∗∗ 32.25∗∗∗ 45.06∗∗∗ 68.56∗∗∗ 106.8∗∗∗
(5.98) (6.39) (4.26) (4.38) (6.61) (7.83)
instown 0.407∗∗∗
(6.47)
MTrade 29.15∗∗∗ 28.08∗∗∗ 16.89∗∗∗ 30.03∗∗∗ 25.36∗∗∗ 28.99∗∗∗
(20.44) (19.27) (11.26 ) (12.81) (13.66) (16.47)
illiq(avg) −285∗∗ −129∗ −206∗ 422 −200∗∗∗
(−2.23) (−1.67) (−1.75) (0.22) (−1.67)
ln(size) 0.05∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(6.41) (4.39) (2.06) (1.87) (6.91)
Observations 74875 74875 74875 74875 74875 60835
R2 0.035 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
Panel B
DITrade 0.1494
∗∗∗ 0.1730∗∗∗ 0.0640∗∗∗ 0.1601∗∗∗ 0.1476∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(7.16 ) (8.32) (2.92) ( 5.51) (6.52) (6.09)
instown 0.472∗∗∗
(7.55)
MTrade 29.42∗∗∗ 28.22∗∗∗ 17.43∗∗∗ 9.60∗∗∗ 26.03∗∗∗ 31.41∗∗∗
( 20.83) (19.65) (11.45) (11.86) (13.92) (18.11)
illiq(avg) −288∗∗ 133∗ −201∗ 38 −213∗
(−2.25) (−1.72) (−1.72) (0.19) (−1.74)
ln(size) 0.06∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(6.45) ( 4.52) (2.10 ) (1.86) (6.55)
Observations 74875 74875 74875 74875 74875 60835
R2 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04
Time effects Y Y Y Y
Firm effects Y
Time cluster Y
Firm cluster Y Y Y Y Y
Fama MacBeth Y
***, **, and * denote statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
In Table 2.4, we reexamine the relationship between commonality in liquidity and institutional
trading activity for sub-samples obtained by dividing the sample by size quartiles, average illiquidity
quartiles, positive and negative market-return quarters, and sub-periods. The results are presented in
Panels A and C of Table 2.4. The first four columns show a significant positive relationship between
institutional trading and commonality in liquidity in all size sub-samples. Also, there exists a strong
positive relationship between institutional trading and commonality in liquidity in all liquidity sub-
samples, except for the most illiquid stocks (last column).
Panels B and D report the results for different sub-periods and for up- and down-markets. The
first three columns show that the association between institutional trading and liquidity commonality
is present in all sub-periods. However the magnitude of the coefficient of this relationship varies over
time. In the last two columns we split the sample in up- and down-market quarters and find a strong
association in both market regimes. The coefficient on ITrade is larger in quarters with positive
market returns, 132.2 with a t-statistic of 6.10, as opposed to 97.35 with a t-statistic of 6.03 in
quarters with negative market returns. Nevertheless, the difference between the coefficients is not
statistically significant.
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Overall, these findings provide clear evidence that stocks with high institutional investor trading
activity are characterized by strong liquidity comovement. This finding is not driven by institutions’
portfolio choices, which gives further credence to the interpretation of the findings of Koch et al.
(2012). Also the association can not be attributed to retail investors’ trading. The relation is robust
to different assumptions with respect to functional forms, unobserved heterogeneity, observations’
independence, as well as a variety of sub-samples based on size, illiquidity and market conditions.
Table 2.4: Relationship between Commonality in Liquidity and Institutional Trading:
Sub-sample Analysis
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of estimates of on selected stock characteristics measured
at the end of the previous quarter for different subsamples. βHI is estimated from time-series regressions of
daily changes in liquidity on changes in liquidity of a portfolio of stocks highly traded by institutions. ITrade
is the number of shares traded by institutions divided by number of shares outstanding, MTrade is the total
volume for as reported in CRSP, divided by the number of shares outstanding. illiq(avg) is the firm’s average
Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure over the previous quarter. instown is the number of shares held by all
institutional investors divided by number of shares outstanding. ln(size) is the natural logarithm of market
capitalization. Panels A and C report results of regressions for size and illiquidity quartile-based subsamples.
Panels B and D report results of regressions for two subperiods and for up- and down-markets separately, where
up (down) market periods are quarters in which the market return was positive (negative). Panels A and B
use the standard measure of ITrade, and Panels C and D use a dummy equal to 1 if ITrade is in the top
quartile in a given quarter, and zero otherwise. Time dummies are included in all regressions. Standard errors
are clustered by firm.
Size Illiq(avg)
Panel A Low 2 3 High Low 2 3 High
ITrade 66.99∗∗∗ 93.79∗∗∗ 110.4∗∗∗ 100.5∗∗∗ 93.83∗∗∗ 90.59∗∗∗ 107.6∗∗∗ 35.15
(3.04) (4.22) (3.58) (3.29) (3.58) (3.33) (4.80) (1.39)
instown 0.342∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗
(3.12) (2.15) (3.29) (2.43) (2.60) (3.06) (2.37) (3.19)
MTrade 31.46∗∗∗ 28.15∗∗∗ 22.31∗∗∗ 27.95∗∗∗ 26.04∗∗∗ 27.06∗∗∗ 36.74∗∗∗ 53.25∗∗∗
(9.40) (9.85) (8.19) (6.71) (8.79) (7.84) (9.36) (10.51)
illiq(avg) −51.30 −222.70 949.10 14383.8∗∗ 38960.3∗∗ 9584.8∗∗ 1581.8∗∗ 54.40
(−0.52) (−0.68) (0.93) (2.77) (3.03) (3.27) (3.04) (0.69)
ln(size) 0.0314 0.0383 0.0869 0.0478∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.254∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.0842
(0.62) (0.59) (1.50) (1.92) (3.27) (4.50) (3.12) (1.95)
Observations 14940 14186 14934 16775 16339 14406 14643 15447
R2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08
Panel B 1999-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 Down Mkt Up Mkt
ITrade 108.1∗∗∗ 88.55∗∗∗ 95.79∗∗∗ 97.35∗∗∗ 132.2∗∗∗
(5.17) (3.77) (4.50) (6.03) (6.10)
instown −0.112 0.358∗∗∗ 0.636∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 0.314∗∗∗
(−1.11) (3.70) (6.76) (6.04) (3.41)
MTrade 30.77∗∗∗ 28.98∗∗∗ 23.80∗∗∗ 29.14∗∗∗ 28.06∗∗∗
(11.65) (9.53) (8.66) (14.73) (12.20)
illiq(avg) 224.7∗∗∗ 383.9 −308.9∗∗∗ −329.5∗ −139.2
(3.55) (1.35) (−3.35) (−2.42) (−1.15)
ln(size) −0.0450∗∗ −0.0022 0.1810∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0692∗∗∗
(−3.15) (−0.16) (16.30) (5.65) (5.77)
Observations 15470 21968 23397 42811 18024
R2 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04
Size Illiq(avg)
Panel C Low 2 3 High Low 2 3 High
DITrade 0.0712 0.164
∗∗∗ 0.214∗∗∗ 0.0265 0.0633 0.200∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗ 0.0221
(1.50) (3.57) (4.71) (0.51) (1.32) (4.37) (3.25) (0.42)
instown 0.377∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗ 0.491∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(3.46) (2.55) (3.81) (3.14) (3.22) (3.35) (3.00) (3.37)
MTrade 33.90∗∗∗ 29.83∗∗∗ 23.39∗∗∗ 31.21∗∗∗ 28.21∗∗∗ 27.87∗∗∗ 40.03∗∗∗ 55.62∗∗∗
(10.39) (10.46) (9.38) (7.45) (9.67) (8.42) (10.45) (11.37)
illiq(avg) −61 −275.7 747.7 13625.5∗∗ 38261.8∗∗ 9767.9∗∗∗ 1572.0** 52.2
(−0.61) (−0.83) (0.73) (2.71) (2.97) (3.30) (3.03) -0.67
ln(size) 0.0204 0.0336 0.0827 0.0398 0.0953∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.0794
(0.40) (0.52) (1.43) (1.60) (3.02) (4.53) (3.06) (1.84)
Observations 14940 14186 14934 16775 16339 14406 14643 15447
R2 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08
Panel D 1999-2003 2004-2007 2008-2011 Down Mkt Up Mkt
DITrade 0.183
∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗
(4.04) (3.36) (2.85) (5.21) (3.40)
instown −0.0739 0.411∗∗∗ 0.708∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗
(−0.74) (4.32) (7.60) (6.90) (4.42)
MTrade 32.61∗∗∗ 31.01∗∗∗ 26.20∗∗∗ 31.08∗∗∗ 31.64∗∗∗
(12.26) (10.62) (9.87) (16.23) (13.87)
illiq(avg) 223.4∗∗∗ 383.3 −328.1∗∗∗ −345.0∗ −154.9
(3.45) (1.35) (−3.49) (−2.52) (−1.24)
ln(size) −0.0478∗∗∗ −0.0043 0.178∗∗∗ 0.0518∗∗∗ 0.0647∗∗∗
(−3.34) (−0.31) (16.08) (5.40) (5.38)
Observations 15470 21968 23397 42811 18024
R2 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04
***, **, and * denote statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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2.4.2 Aggregate Fund Flows
In the previous subsection, we provide evidence that stock liquidity comovement is associated with
institutional trading activity. As argued in Section 2.2, we expect more correlated trading when
a large number of institutions are forced to demand liquidity. To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we
follow Koch et al. (2012) and use aggregate fund flows as a proxy for market-wide shocks to the
institutions’ demand for liquidity. More specifically, we calculate the quarterly net dollar flow variable
by aggregating the flow of money into or out of equity mutual funds industry each quarter. We
compute the dollar net money flow into fund i in month t as:
DOLLAR FLOWi,t = TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1(1 +Ri,t) (2.7)
where TNAi,t is the Total Net Assets of fund i in month t and Ri,t is the fund return over the period
t−1 to t, as reported in the CRSP Mutual Fund Database. To compute the quarterly flows, we sum
the dollar flows and divide them by TNA at the end of the previous quarter.
In Table 2.5, we report the results of estimating (2.5) with interactions of ITrade and MTrade
with two dummies: an extreme-flow dummy that equals one if the quarter is in the top and bottom
10% of the time series distribution of flows respectively; and a negative-flow dummy that equals
one for quarters with negative net flows. Column (1) shows that the impact of institutional trading
on commonality in liquidity is much stronger during periods of extreme net flows than in normal
periods. Specifically, the coefficient on ITrade is 54.15 in quarters without extreme flows compared
to 54.15 + 40.27 = 94.42 in quarters with extreme flows. In column (2) we include the interaction
of MTrade with extreme-flow dummy as an additional control. Although the estimated coefficient
on the interaction term is small and not statistically significant, the coefficient on the interaction of
extreme-flow with ITrade becomes smaller and only significant at the 10% level.
Columns (3) and (4) report the results when ITrade and MTrade are interacted with the
negative-flow dummy. In contrast to the results of Koch et al. (2012), our findings are not con-
sistent with the impact of institutional trading on commonality in liquidity being more pronounced
when mutual funds experience outflows.
In column (5), we include both institutional ownership and an interaction term of institutional
ownership with the extreme-flow dummy. The coefficient on the interaction term between ITrade
and the extreme-flow dummy is no longer significant. Moreover, the interaction term between insti-
tutional ownership and the extreme-flow dummy is not significant either. In column (6), we include
an interaction term between institutional ownership and the negative-flow dummy. Interestingly,
institutional ownership and the interaction term between institutional ownership and the negative-
flow dummy are highly significant. However, the coefficient on the interaction term is more than
twice as large as the coefficient on institutional ownership, suggesting that the explanatory power of
institutional ownership with respect to commonality in liquidity detected in Table 2.3 is largely due
to quarters with negative flows.
Therefore, in contrast to Koch et al. (2012), we do not find evidence that the link between
institutional trading activity and commonality in liquidity is stronger in periods of extreme flows
or negative flows. One possible interpretation of these results is that in periods of extreme flows
or negative flows, the level of trading by institutions increases, but not the degree of correlation in
trading activity across institutions. Consistently with this explanation, the reason why Koch et al.
(2012) find a stronger association between institutional ownership and commonality in liquidity in
periods of extreme and negative flows is because institutional trading activity increases in those
periods and not because trading becomes more correlated across institutions. Since the fluctuations
in the level of trading are already captured by our proxy for institutional trading activity, the
interaction term with mutual fund flows is not significant.
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Table 2.5: Relation Between Liquidity Commonality and Institutional Trading Condi-
tional on Aggregate Mutual Fund Flows
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of estimates of on selected stock characteristics measured
at the end of the previous quarter, conditional on aggregate mutual fund flows. βHI is estimated from time-
series regressions of daily changes in liquidity on changes in liquidity of a portfolio of stocks highly traded by
institutions. ITrade is the number of shares traded by institutions divided by number of shares outstanding,
MTrade is the total volume for as reported in CRSP, divided by the number of shares outstanding. illiq(avg)
is the firm’s average Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure over the previous quarter. instown is the number
of shares held by all institutional investors divided by number of shares outstanding. ln(size) is the natural
logarithm of market capitalization. In columns (1) to (4) we interact ITrade and MTrade with dummies based
on aggregate net flows. All aggregate flows are scaled by total US market capitalization and flows are measured
contemporaneously with βHI . In columns (1) and (2) we interact ITrade with a dummy variable extremflow
that equals one if aggregate net flows are in either the highest 10% or lowest 10% for that quarter, and zero
otherwise. In column (2) and(4) we interact ITrade and MTrade with a dummy variable negflow that equals
one if aggregate net flows are negative for that quarter, and zero otherwise. In column (5) and (6) we control
for instown. Time dummies are included but not reported. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ITrade 54.15∗∗∗ 56.23∗∗∗ 58.45∗∗∗ 58.44∗∗∗ 104.6∗∗∗ 110.3∗∗∗
(5.49) (5.59) (5.17) (4.98) (7.11) (6.03)
ITrade ∗ extremflow 40.27∗∗∗ 29.49∗ 15.95
(2.72) (1.77) (0.54)
ITrade ∗ negflow 6.046 6.065 −10.43
(0.45) (0.40) (−0.43)
instown 0.439∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗
(6.50) (2.50)
instown ∗ extremflow −0.159
(−1.33)
instown ∗ negflow 0.448∗∗∗
(4.33)
MTrade 27.98∗∗∗ 27.20∗∗∗ 28.05∗∗∗ 28.05∗∗∗ 27.63∗∗∗ 30.81∗∗∗
(19.26) (18.42) (19.35) (16.98) (16.21) (15.10)
MTrade ∗ extremflow 3.371 5.301∗
(1.39) (1.70)
MTrade ∗ negflow −0.0066 −3.591
(−0.00) (−1.46)
illiq(avg) −284∗∗ −285∗∗ −284∗∗ −284∗∗ −201.9∗ −195.7∗
(−2.23) (−2.23) (−2.23) (−2.23) (−1.68) (1.65)
ln(size) 0.0550∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0549∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ 0.0599∗∗∗
(6.42) (6.40) (6.41) (6.42) (6.87) (6.88)
Observations 74875 74875 74875 74875 60835 60835
R2 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
***, **, and * denote statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
2.5 Common Trading
To test our third hypothesis, pairs of stocks connected through common institutional trading exhibit
higher commonality in liquidity, we follow an approach analogous to that proposed by Anto´n and
Polk (2014). In particular, we form pairs of common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) from NYSE,
Amex and Nasdaq whose market capitalization is above one billion and we require firms to have at
least 200 observation per year. We choose this filtering criteria to limit the number of pairs. Table 2.6
reports the number of stocks, pairs of stocks, and trading institutions, as defined by ANcerno client
codes. Table 2.7 reports the extent of institutional trading. For the entire sample period, the median
number of institutions per traded stock is 121, while the median number of stocks traded by each
institution is 566.
We report the number of common institutions for a pair of stocks in Table 2.8. All stock pairs
have at least one active institutional trading in common and the median pair has 14 institutional
investors in common. The table also shows that the number of common institutional trading-based
connections between stocks in our sample has increased over the period we study. In 1999, the
median number of common institutional trading connections was 6. In 2009, the median number of
trading connections was 24, although this figure is only 14 in the last year of our sample period.
Table 2.9 reports estimation results. In column (1), we estimate a specification with the number
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of institutions trading in both stocks as a regressor and find a positive and statistically significant
link between that variable and liquidity comovement between two stocks. A change of one standard
deviation in the degree of common trading results is associated with a 7.3% increase in the expected
product of liquidity changes relative to the average degree of covariation.
The ability to forecast differences in liquidity comovement using institutional connectedness would
be expected if the predictability simply reflects the fact that the institutions choose to trade stocks
that are similar even if institutional trading is not associated with liquidity commonality. Therefore,
we include four variables to control for stock similarity. The results of this analysis are reported in
columns (2)-(4) of Table 2.9. Control variables are normalized to have a standard deviation of one
and transformed (in the case of size, book-to-market, and momentum) so that higher values indicate
greater style similarity. The coefficient on our measure of common institutions is similar to that
found in column (1), although comovement in stock liquidity also seems to be strongly associated
with stock similarity. The coefficient on common institutional trading has the second strongest
economic significance among all variables under consideration.
Table 2.6: Number of Stocks, Pairs and Institutions Per Year
This table lists the total number of stocks, pairs of stocks, and institutions for every year of the sample
period. The sample consists of all NYSE-Amex-Nasdaq stocks that are above NYSE median capitaliza-
tion as of the end of each month. The fourth column lists the number of institutions that trade at least
one of the stocks in the sample.
Year Stocks Pairs Institutions
1999 737 271216 379
2000 839 351541 370
2001 837 349866 398
2002 813 330078 424
2003 817 333336 401
2004 988 487578 404
2005 1081 583740 376
2006 1170 683865 399
2007 1185 701520 377
2008 1027 526851 333
2009 845 356590 322
2010 1003 502503 308
2011 1070 571915 259
Table 2.7: Number of Institutions and Stocks Summary Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for the sample defined in Table 6 over the following variables:
number of institutions that trade each stock and number of stocks traded by each institution.
Panel A: 1999-2011
Mean Median SD Min Max
Institutions per stock 129.74 121 61.79 1 361
Stocks per Institution 612.76 566 341.90 1 1508
Panel B: 1999-2002
Mean Median SD Min Max
Institutions per stock 142.84 130 74.35 1 361
Stocks per Institution 509.30 454 296.55 1 1468
Panel C: 2003-2007
Mean Median SD Min Max
Institutions per stock 123.89 116 56.69 1 348
Stocks per Institution 652.83 599 361.25 1 1508
Panel D: 2008-2011
Mean Median SD Min Max
Institutions per stock 124.32 119 51.60 1 276
Stocks per Institution 663.41 641 335.75 1 1324
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Table 2.8: The Cross-sectional Distribution of Common Institutions
This table reports the distribution of the variable Fij,t measuring the number of Institutions trading
both stocks in a pair during the previous month. The distribution is shown for the average of full sample
and for each year in the sample.
Common Institutions(Fij.t) Percentiles
mean sd 0% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% 100%
Full Sample 15.93 10.77 1 9 14 21 29 36 53 185
1999 8.34 7.12 1 4 6 11 16 21 36 132
2000 10.59 8.86 1 5 8 13 21 27 44 158
2001 14.00 10.58 1 7 11 18 26 33 54 170
2002 17.27 12.05 1 9 15 22 32 40 61 185
2003 15.62 11.01 1 8 13 21 30 36 53 167
2004 15.18 9.30 1 9 13 19 27 33 47 170
2005 13.45 8.52 1 8 12 17 24 30 43 117
2006 14.60 9.54 1 8 13 18 26 33 49 124
2007 15.66 9.29 1 9 14 20 27 33 48 131
2008 20.20 11.28 1 13 18 25 34 41 58 164
2009 26.00 12.81 1 17 24 32 42 50 68 161
2010 20.98 10.86 1 14 19 26 35 42 58 140
2011 16.28 9.05 1 10 14 20 28 34 48 118
Table 2.9: Liquidity Commonality in a Pair of Stocks
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimate of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting the realized
cross-product of changes in stock illiquidity for a sample of stocks. The predictive variables are updated
monthly and include our main measure of institutional connectedness, the number of institutions trading
in both stocks Fij,t, and a series of controls at time t. We measure similarity of the two stocks in the pair
as the negative of the absolute value of the difference in size, BE/ME and momentum percentile ranking
across the two stocks in the pair (DIFF SIZEij,t, DIFF BEMEij,t, DIFF MOMij,t respectively).
We also measure the number of similar SIC digits, NUM SICij,t for the two stocks in a pair as well as
size percentile of each stock in the pair and an interaction (SIZE1ij,t, SIZE2ij,t, SIZE1SIZE2ij,t).
All independent variables are then rank transformed and normalized to have a unit standard deviation,
which we denote with an asterisk superscript. We calculate Newey-West standard errors (four lags) of
the Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional slopes.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
F ∗ 0.0123∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(5.76) (5.5) (7.72) (7.99)
Constant 0.1601∗∗∗ 0.1601∗∗∗ 0.1602∗∗∗ 0.1601∗∗∗
(7.46) (7.46) (7.47) (7.47)
DIFF SIZE∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗
(7.22) (7.15)
DIFF BEME∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(6.29) (6.54)
DIFF MOM∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗
(6.01) (6.05)
NUM SIC∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗∗
(16.84) (16.74)
SIZE1∗ 0.0008 0.0003
(0.46) (0.17)
SIZE2∗ −0.0000 −0.0005
(−0.01) (−0.3)
SIZE1SIZE2∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
(12.51) (12.5)
***, **, and * denote statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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2.6 The Mutual Fund Scandal of 2003
Thus far, our results indicate that commonality in liquidity is higher for stocks that are highly traded
by institutional investors. We also show that our results are robust to different specifications. As
we estimate these effects using lagged ITrade at the quarterly frequency, an important issue is the
extent to which we can make statements about the causal nature of the relationship between ITrade
and βHI . Two concerns are in order. First, a third variable, such as a specific stock characteristic,
could be causing both institutional trading in a certain group of stocks and commonality in liquidity.
Controlling for observable stock characteristics and time-invariant unobservable characteristics is
not enough if the third variable is not observable and varies through time. Second, a positive
relation between ITrade and βHI is consistent with commonality in liquidity causing institutional
trading. For instance, a market-wide deterioration of liquidity risk could lead investors to unwind
their positions to reduce future liquidity risk. To address this concern, this section deals with the
potential consequences of endogeneity.
Building on Anto´n and Polk (2014), we propose to exploit a natural experiment based on the
mutual fund scandal that occurred in September 2003. In the last quarter of 2003, 25 fund families
faced allegations of illegal trading that included market timing and late trading. Affected funds
experienced significant outflows as a consequence of the scandal. Kisin (2011) documents that the
funds of affected families continued to experience outflow until 2006. The estimated losses of assets
for the affected funds are 14.1% within a year and 24.3% in two years since the scandal broke.
McCabe (2009) estimates the losses 36 months after the scandal to be 37% of the assets under
management for the involved fund families. We argue that capital flows arising from this scandal
are exogenous to funds’ trading activities, and so is the excess trading experienced by stocks more
widely held by mutual funds.
More specifically, we instrument institutional trading on a given stock with the fraction of shares
of that stock owned by all scandal-affected institutions divided by the fraction of shares owned by
all institutions as the time scandal broke or one quarter before the scandal. We then use two-
stage least-squares estimation, where the natural experiment takes place (from December 2003 to
December 2006). Column (1) of Table 2.10 shows the results of the first-stage regression, ITrade on
fraction0 and various controls used in regression (2.5). The coefficient on fraction0 is positive and
highly significant. Column (2) of Table 2.10 presents the results of the second-stage regression, where
the dependent variable is βHI,it+1. The coefficient on ITrade is positive and large in magnitude, but
statistically insignificant. While the scandal-affected families experienced outflows in the 36 months
following the scandal, the effect of their trades on illiquidity movements could have faded through
time as the market anticipated abnormal trading in the stocks held by those families. In columns
(3) and (4), we estimate the 2SLS regressions excluding 2006. The coefficient on ITrade for the
second stage is statistically significant but only at the 10% level. Therefore, we find no evidence of
a causal effect of institutional trading–as a response to the scandal–on commonality in liquidity for
the market as a whole, except for, perhaps, the first two years following the fraud allegations.
In Table 2.4, we show the association between institutional trading and commonality in liquidity
is stronger for the most liquid stocks and stocks with the largest market capitalization. Building
on those results, in columns (5)-(6) we report regression results for stocks in the top quintile of the
market capitalization and liquidity distribution. In contrast to the results for all stocks, in both
subsamples, the coefficient on ITrade for the second stage regression is not only positive but also
statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Table 2.10: Mutual fund Scandal of 2003
This table reports results from a 2SLS instrumental variables regression based on mutual funds
scandal 2003, using data from December 2003 to December 2006. In the first stage, we predict
the variable ITradeit with the fraction of shares owned by all scandal funds divided by the
fraction of shares owned by all funds as the time scandal broke or one quarter before the scandal
fractioni0 column (1). The second stage of the regression uses the fitted ITrade to forecast the
βHI,it+1 column (2). In columns (3) and (4) we report the results excluding 2006. Columns (5)
and (6) report estimation results for the sub-sample of stocks in the top quintile of the market
capitalization distribution. In columns (7) and (8), we report results for the sub-sample of stocks
in the top quintile of the liquidity distribution. Time dummies are included, but not reported.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ITrade 847.18 1239.22∗ 1531.3∗∗ 801.53**
(1.46) (1.89) (2.04) (1.96)
instown 0.0011∗∗∗ −0.7018 0.0011∗∗∗ −1.158 0.0009∗∗∗ −0.8960 0.0012∗∗∗ −0.4981
(21.83) (−1.04) (17.09) (−1.55) (12.72) (−1.16) (15.85 ) (−0.90)
fraction0 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0016∗∗∗
(4.68) (3.96) (5.26) (6.37)
MTrade 0.0661∗∗∗ −8.274 0.0728∗∗∗ −39.279 0.0534∗∗∗ −16.17 0.0530 2.8984
(50.22) (−0.21) (43.03) (−0.82) (27.94) (−0.39) (31.40) (0.13)
ln(size) −0.00004∗∗∗ 0.01054 −0.00004∗∗∗ 0.0121 −0.00004∗∗∗ 0.180∗∗∗ −.0001∗∗∗ 0.1036∗∗
(−7.49) (0.34) (−6.52) (0.32) (−3.54) (3.54) (−8.18) (2.33)
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation 11004 11004 7772 7772 3486 3486 6109 6109
R2 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.30
F−stat 21.92 15.67 27.67 40.61
***, **, and * denote statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
2.7 Robustness Tests
The empirical evidence thus far suggests that stocks that are highly traded by institutional investors
exhibit strong commonality in liquidity. The relation between βHI and ITrade is robust to various
model specifications. In this section, we show that our main findings are not affected by the the first-
step liquidity beta estimation. In particular, we address the concerns that arise from using Amihud
illiquidity measure as a proxy for stock liquidity. For instance, the liquidity co-variation that we
document could be induced by commonality in (absolute) returns, not necessarily by comovements
in the ratio of absolute returns to dollar volume. We first show that our results are not driven by
returns or volatility comovement, and then demonstrate that our findings are not particular to the
structure of our first step time-series regression.
We follow Koch et al. (2012) and address the impact of return comovements and volatility co-
movements in three different ways. First, we estimate the covariance between individual stock return
and the value-weighted return of the high institutional trading portfolio and add it as an additional
control in the regression equation (2.5). We refer to this variable as institutional return beta. The
results of these regressions are presented in Panel A Table 2.11. Column (1) reports the results of
equation (2.5) after adding institutional return beta as an additional control, consistent with Koch
et al. (2012) we find that institutional return beta has a strong positive impact on βHI . This shows
that commonality in return (information affecting return on high institutional trading stocks) has an
impact on commonality in liquidity among these stocks. Nevertheless, the positive impact of insti-
tutional trading activity on βHI still remains highly significant. Second, we run our base regression
(2.5) on sub-samples based on institutional return beta quartiles to capture any potential non-linear
relationship between liquidity beta and institutional return beta. The results of these regression are
reported in column (2) through column (5). We find that our main findings hold in all sub-samples
as indicated by highly significant and positive estimate for the impact of ITrade on βHI . Third,
we alter the first step time series regression (2.4) by adding the return of high institutional trading
stocks portfolio to account for the potential impact of covariation between stock liquidity and the
return of highly trade stocks portfolio. Column (6) reports the result of equation (2.5) using βHI
from the modified first step specification as dependent variable. We still find a positive significant
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impact of ITrade on βHI .
Table 2.11: Robustness Tests: Controlling for Return and Volatility Comovement
This table reports results from pooled OLS regressions of estimates of on selected stock characteristics measured
at the end of the previous quarter, conditional on aggregate mutual fund flows. βHI is estimated from time-
series regressions of daily changes in liquidity on changes in liquidity of a portfolio of stocks highly traded by
institutions. ITrade is the number of shares traded by institutions divided by number of shares outstanding,
MTrade is the total volume for as reported in CRSP, divided by the number of shares outstanding. illiq(avg)
is the firm’s average Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure over the previous quarter. instown is the number
of shares held by all institutional investors divided by number of shares outstanding. ln(size) is the natural
logarithm of market capitalization. The first column repeats the standard regression of βHI on ITrade and
includes as an additional control variable the beta estimate between the firm return and the value-weighted
return on the high institutional trading portfolio estimated contemporaneously with the liquidity beta. columns
(2) to (5) run the above regression on cross-sectional sub-samples sorted by the return beta. Model (6) runs
the same regression, but controls for return covariation in the first stage. Specifically, the dependent variable is
a liquidity beta estimated in a time series regression that controls for firm returns and the return on the high
institutional trading portfolio. We repeat this analysis in Panel B, substituting squared returns, return2, for
returns, as a proxy for volatility.
Panel A: Controlling for Comovement in Return
Return Beta
Low 2 3 High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ITrade 100.7∗∗∗ 99.03∗∗∗ 60.76∗∗ 97.02∗∗∗ 97.89∗∗∗ 102.6∗∗∗
(7.76) (2.82) (2.21) (4.18) (5.11) (7.44)
instown 0.442∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.599∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
(7.21) (3.25) (5.33) (4.28) (2.19) (6.71)
MTrade 19.53∗∗∗ 13.32∗∗∗ 21.07∗∗∗ 25.86∗∗∗ 17.62∗∗∗ 28.91∗∗∗
(12.14) (3.22) (5.40) (8.39) (8.96) (16.40)
Ret beta 0.0001∗∗∗
(20.90)
illiq(avg) −253.5∗ 31.88 −433.2∗∗ −357.1∗∗∗ −507.6∗∗∗ −190.5
(−1.81) (0.26) (−2.29) (−2.96) (−2.68) (−1.56)
ln(size) 0.0962∗∗∗ 0.0542∗∗∗ 0.0881∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗ 0.0619∗∗∗
(10.90) (4.30) (6.08) (8.19) (7.08) (6.93)
Observations 60835 15492 15406 15204 14733 60525
R2 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.04
Panel B: Controlling for Volatility Comovement
Volatility Beta
Low 2 3 High
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ITrade 102.1∗∗∗ 116.1∗∗∗ 75.11∗∗ 103.0∗∗∗ 84.97∗∗∗ 93.79∗∗∗
(7.67) (4.60) (2.18) (4.30) (4.44) (6.91)
instown 0.429∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗ 0.15 0.388∗∗∗
(6.93) (3.22) (6.32) (4.14) (1.37) (6.16)
MTrade 25.43∗∗∗ 20.33∗∗∗ 20.59∗∗∗ 27.96∗∗∗ 19.82∗∗∗ 27.04∗∗∗
(15.18) (6.08) (6.06) (8.76) (9.64) (16.01)
Vol beta 0.0079∗∗∗
(15.01)
illiq(avg) −223.4∗ −88.83 −51.83 −539.3∗∗∗ −524.9∗∗∗ −198.7∗
(−1.75) (−0.49) (−0.47) (−3.08) (−3.72) (−1.69)
ln(size) 0.0745∗∗∗ 0.0373∗∗∗ 0.0934∗∗∗ 0.0967∗∗∗ 0.0930∗∗∗ 0.0519∗∗∗
(8.49) (2.80) (6.96) (6.65) (5.95) (5.84)
Observations 60835 15097 15537 15377 14824 60525
R2 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.04
***, **, and * denote statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Furthermore, we address the concern that our findings could be driven by the fact that common
movements in volatility of stocks traded to a high degree by institutional investors lead to higher
liquidity commonality. We conduct a test similar to that described above, replacing returns in the
time-series regressions with return squared to proxy for stock volatility. We report the result of this
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additional analysis in Panel B of Table 2.11. We find that results obtained from the standard second
stage regression do not change: We still find positive significant impact of ITrade on βHI .
Table 2.12 varies the definition of common trading for our benchmark specification of Table 2.9.
We first replace the number of common institutions, Fij,t, with the total dollar volume by all common
institutions of the two stocks scaled by number of shares outstanding of the two stocks, FTij,t. Our
next alternative is to measure the common trading by the the total cross product of dollar volume by
all common institutions of the two stocks scaled by number of shares outstanding of the two stocks,
FCTij,t . Both alternative measures of common trading forecast the cross-sectional variation in realized
changes in liquidity cross-products.
Table 2.12: Robustness Tests: Liquidity Commonality in a Pair of Stocks
This table reports Fama-McBeth estimate of monthly cross-sectional regressions forecasting the
realized cross-product of changes in stock illiquidity for a sample of stocks. The predictive
variables are updated monthly and include different measures of institutional connectedness and
a series of controls at time t. As measures of connectedness, we use the number of institutions
trading in both stocks, Fij,t; the total trading volume by all common institutions in dollars of the
two stocks scaled by number of shares outstanding of the two stocks, FTij,t; the total cross product
of trading volume by all common institutions in dollars of the two stocks scaled by number of
shares outstanding of the two stocks, FCTij,t . We measure the negative of the absolute value of
the difference in size, BE/ME and momentum percentile ranking across the two stocks in the
pair (DIFF SIZEij,t, DIFF BEMEij,t, DIFF MOMij,t respectively). We also measure the
number of similar SIC digits, NUM SICij,t for the two stocks in a pair as well as size percentile
of each stock in the pair and an interaction (SIZE1ij,t, SIZE2ij,t, SIZE1SIZE2ij,t). All
independent variables are rank-transformed and normalized to have a unit standard deviation,
which we denote with an asterisk superscript. We calculate Newey-West standard errors (four
lags) of the Fama-MacBeth estimates that take into account autocorrelation in the cross-sectional
slopes.
(1) (2) (3)
F ∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(7.99)
FT∗ij,t 0.0028
∗∗∗
(2.44)
FCT∗ij,t 0.0026
∗∗
(2.14)
Constant 0.1602∗∗∗ 0.1611∗∗∗ 0.1611∗∗∗
(7.47) (7.52) (7.52)
DIFF SIZE∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(7.15) (7.04) (7.07)
DIFF BEME∗ 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.004344 0.0043∗∗∗
(6.54) (6.48) (6.5)
DIFF MOM∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗
(6.05) (6.09) (6.09)
NUM SIC∗ 0.0178∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗ 0.0179∗∗∗
(16.74) (16.7) (16.69)
SIZE1∗ 0.0003 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗
(0.17) (2.81) (2.97)
SIZE2∗ −0.0005 0.0045∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗
(-0.3) (2.55) (2.7)
SIZE1SIZE2∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗
(12.5) (12.03) (12.74)
***, **, and * denote statistical significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
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2.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we reevaluate the empirical evidence that institutional investors’ trading activity
induces the liquidity of stocks to move together. We overcome the limitations of previously employed
proxies and establish a direct link between institutional trading activity and liquidity commonality
by using data on actual institutional investor trades obtained from ANcerno Ltd for the 1999-2011
period. Consistent with the interpretation of the findings of Koch et al. (2012), our results suggest
that the trading activity of institutional investors is an important factor in explaining commonality
in liquidity. However, by controlling for institutional ownership we can be confident that these results
are not driven by institutional investors’ portfolio selection effects.
Contrary to our expectation, we do not find evidence that the association between institutional
trading and commonality in liquidity strengthens in periods of extreme or negative flows of money
into and out of mutual funds. A possible interpretation of this result is that in periods of extreme
flows or negative flows, the level of trading by institutions increases, but not the degree of correlation
in trading activity across institutions. Since our variable of interest is institutional trading, the effect
of flows on commonality in liquidity is already taken into account.
We also find evidence that the impact of institutional trading on commonality in liquidity is due
to correlated trading across institutional investors. In particular, the liquidity of pairs of stocks that
are connected through their common active institutional trading covary more together, controlling
for stock characteristics.
Finally, when we instrument trading with the fraction of a stock’s share owned by institutions
affected by the 2003 scandal and focus on the months following the scandal, we find weak evidence
of a causal link from institutional trading to commonality in liquidity for the market as a whole.
However, our results are suggestive of a causal link from institutional trading to commonality in
liquidity for large and liquid firms.
The results of our study are interesting both for market participants and regulators. First,
we document that an increase in institutional investors’ trading activity is associated with higher
commonality in liquidity. This has implications for portfolio managers following active strategies,
who might consider avoiding stocks whose trading is dominated by institutional investors. Second,
our results should be taken as a warning against the large-scale effects of regulations that force
financial institutions to demand liquidity at the same time as a response to a common deterioration
of capital and liquidity levels.
Chapter 3
Short-Term Institutional Herding:
Evidence from Transaction Data
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3.1 Introduction
A growing body of literature on the trading behavior of institutional investors shows that institutions
engage in herding behavior, that is, institutional investors have a tendency to flock together on
the same side of the market for a given stock and a given period. Theoretical literature provides
various potential explanations for institutional herding. Broadly speaking these theories fall into
two major groups, intentional and unintentional herding (Kremer and Nautz, 2013). The intentional
herding may arise due to reputational risk or because institutions infer information from the previous
trades of better-informed managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Sias,
2004). Alternatively, the unintentional herding may occur when institutional investors trade on
common public information or because they share common aversion or attraction to certain stock
characteristics (Froot et al., 1992; Hirshleifer et al., 1994; Falkenstein, 1996). Despite of the rich
theoretical literature on institutional herding, the empirical evidence is at best mixed. Lakonishok
et al. (1992) find a weak evidence of herding behavior among a sample of U.S. pension funds.
Grinblatt et al. (1995) find no evidence of herding among mutual funds. Wermers (1999) finds little
evidence of mutual funds engaging in herding behavior, with slightly stronger evidence in small
stocks. More recently Sias (2004) examines the time-series properties of institutional demand for a
security and find a strong evidence of institutional herding.
The weak connection between the theory and evidence could result from the fact that herding
behavior is a high frequency phenomenon. On one hand, the theoretical models provide various
explanations and conditions under which herding may arise in financial markets in a high-frequency
trading context. On the other hand, due to data limitations, the empirical studies rely on the low
frequency data, quarterly holding, to investigate the predictions of these theoretical models. However,
for example, if herding behavior arises because investors infer information from the previous trades
of better-informed investors, we would expect them to update their beliefs more quickly and trade in
the same direction. Furthermore, if herding occurs due to the correlated signals about the firm, such
information can only be exploited at short-term horizons. Therefore, measuring institutional herding
at quarterly frequency may bias the results and fail to detect the short-term institutional herding.
Moreover, the low-frequent data impede the analysis of the price impact of institutional herding; since
we cannot examine the intra-quarter relation between institutional trading and returns, it is unclear
whether institutions react to or lead stock price movements. The current study addresses these data
limitations and employ a proprietary database of daily institutional transaction data to test whether
institutions herd at weekly level, investigate the determinant of short-term institutional herding,
and the consequences of institutional herding on security prices. Understanding the different drivers
and types of institutional herding is important for regulatory purposes and whether institutional
herding leads to market inefficiencies. Because we only observe the trade of each institution and
not the motives behind these trades, identifying whether the herding is intentional or unintentional
is a difficult task. However, I follow the previous empirical studies and link herding behavior to
information environment of the firm by using variables such as firm size and daily turnover to proxy
for the quality and available information about the firm.
Several other empirical studies address these data limitations and use higher frequency data
to investigate herding behavior in financial markets. For example, Barber et al. (2009a) address
the issues of the low frequency data using Trade and Quotes (TAQ) and Institute for the Study
of Security Markets (ISSM) transaction data. Although the data they employ are anonymous,
not investor specific, their results suggest that individual investors engage in short-term herding
behavior and that the small trade order imbalance can reliably predict weekly returns. Venezia et al.
(2011) investigate the monthly herding behavior among professional and amateur investors using
transaction data provided by a large bank in Israel. They find a herding tendency among both types
of investors, however, the herding behavior is lower among professionals, herding depends on stock
characteristics such as size and systematic risk, and that their results are consistent with the theory
of information-based herding. Kremer and Nautz (2013) study the herding behavior at daily level
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among the German institutional investors using a comprehensive database of all transactions made
by all German institutions. These authors distinguish between the intentional and unintentional
herding behavior and find that institutional herding depends on stock characteristics such as past
returns and volatility, and that their results are consistent with the unintentional herding hypothesis.
The current study contributes to the empirical literature on institutional herding by employing
daily transactional data for a large sample of U.S. institutional investors. The data distributed by
ANcerno Ltd., a private transaction costs analyst, provide a unique opportunity to investigate the
short-term institutional herding as they contain detailed information on the trade-by-trade transac-
tions made by all institutions in the sample. This database overcomes many of the data limitations
inherent in the previous studies and provides new evidence on the weekly herding behavior of insti-
tutional investors and its impact on prices for a broad cross-section of stocks on the U.S. markets.
I investigate the weekly institutional herding behavior using Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1992) measure (LSV) and compute the sample average over all the stocks and time periods. A
positive and significant herding measure would be in favor of herding behavior. Next, I follow Kremer
and Nautz (2013) and study whether institutional herding is intentional or unintentional. To examine
the type and the determinants of institutional herding, I use two different approaches. First, I follow
Wermers (1999) and use a portfolio sort method based on firm size and prior week returns. Second,
in a multivariate setting I estimate a cross-sectional regressions using Fama and MacBeth (1973)
approach. Finally, I examine whether institutional herding has a stabilizing or destabilizing impact
on prices by regressing a set of future cumulative returns against the buy and sell herding measures.
Moreover, I follow Dasgupta et al. (2011) and study the impact of the persistence in the investment
decisions of institutional investors on security prices using Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach.
The results can be summarized as follow. First, there is little evidence of institutional herding
at weekly horizon. The overall (LSV) herding measure of 2.5% suggests that among 100 institutions
trading a stock during the week, there are two more institutions on the same side of the market than
what would be expected if they trade randomly and independently. Second, there is more herding
on the buy side than on the sell side of the market. In addition, a sub-period analysis shows that the
level of herding before 2007 (before the financial crisis) is stronger than the herding intensity in the
most recent years (the crisis and the post-crisis period). Third, institutional buy and sell herding
affect asset prices differently. While the buy herding is positively associated with the future returns,
the sell herding is related to return reversals. Finally, the persistence of institutional herding over
multiple weeks is a strong predictor of return reversals, that is, stocks consistently sold by institutions
over three to six weeks outperform the stocks bought by them over the next eight to twenty-four
weeks.
The weak evidence of institutional herding at weekly horizons is consistent with quarterly findings
in the previous studies. Lakonishok et al. (1992) find a weak evidence of herding behavior among
pension funds and Wermers (1999) document a weak evidence of mutual fund herding. The price
impact results are similar to that for the German institutions documented in Kremer and Nautz
(2013) who find an asymmetric impact of buy and sell herding on prices. While the buy herding has
a stabilizing effect, the sell herding affect prices in a destabilizing manner. Furthermore, the findings
on the short-term persistence of institutional herding are consistent with the long-term results found
in Dasgupta et al. (2011), such that the persistence in institutional herding leads to return reversals.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follow. In Section 3.2 I develop the main hypotheses.
Section 3.3 presents the applied herding measure and the testing methodology. Section 3.4 discusses
the main empirical results. Section 3.5 provides some conclusions remarks.
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3.2 Hypotheses
According to the economic theory, herding behavior in financial markets could arise when investors
intentionally disregard their prior beliefs and follow the trades of other market participants or when
investors unintentionally react to common signals by analysing the same sources of information. The
unintentional herding may occur when institutions receive correlated signals about the firm or follow
the same indicators, leading them to deduce similar conclusions about the future payoffs of a given
security (Hirshleifer et al., 1994). It may also arise if institutional traders share common preferences
or aversion to certain stock characteristics (Falkenstein, 1996). Additionally, fund managers can
be seen as a relatively homogenous group sharing similar education as well as professional skills,
therefore, they tend to interpret the information in a similar fashion. Alternatively, the institutional
herding my arise when fund managers intentionally ignore their own private information and follow
the trades of other investors (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Based on the
predictions of the theoretical models and the empirical findings found at quarterly level, the first
hypothesis captures the idea of whether institutional investors engage in herding behavior at weekly
level.
Hypothesis 1: Institutional investors tend to be net buyers or sellers for a given
stock and during a given period .
Fund managers having low quality information about the future earnings for the stocks compro-
mising their portfolio holdings have greater motives to ignore their noisy private information and
follow the crowd if the market consensus is different Wermers (1999). This type of herding is es-
pecially common in markets where little public information is available. Previous studies suggest
that large firms experience greater predisclosure information production and propagation than the
small ones (Atiase, 1985). This is because large firms usually release more information and there are
more security analysts following large firms than small firms. Therefore, firm size is used as a proxy
reflecting the amount and the quality of information available. Since less information is produced
about small firms, institutional herding in this subgroup of stocks would be evidence in favor of
intentional herding. It should also be noted that higher institutional herding on the sell side for
the small stocks is consistent with the notion that institutional traders share common aversion to
small stocks (Falkenstein, 1996). Alternatively, the unintentional herding would be more prevalent
among large stocks as institutions have more commonality in information. The empirical evidence
found at quarterly horizon support the intentional herding hypothesis as there is higher institutional
herding among small firms (Lakonishok et al., 1992; Wermers, 1999; Choi and Sias, 2009). Thus, the
second hypothesis captures the relationship between institutional herding and firm size to distinguish
between the intentional and unintentional herding.
Hypothesis 2: There is greater institutional herding among small capitalization firms
than the large firms.
Grinblatt et al. (1995) show that the majority of mutual funds engage in positive feedback trad-
ing strategies to pick stocks. Moreover, Wermers (1999) shows that the intensity of institutional
herding is higher among stocks with extreme prior returns, in particular, mutual funds tend to buy
past winners more frequently than selling past losers. Sias (2004) shows that institutional herding is
in part due to institutional positive feedback trading. Building on the previous empirical findings,
institutional herding arising as a consequence of simultaneous reaction to past price movements is
consistent with the unintentional herding. That is, institutions may follow each other into and out
of the same securities because they share common attraction (aversion) to stocks with high posi-
tive (negative) past returns. Thus, the third hypothesis captures the relation between institutional
herding and past stock returns to distinguish between the intentional and unintentional herding. A
positive relation between the past returns and LSV herding measure would be evidence in favor of
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the unintentional herding.
Hypothesis 3: Institutional herding arises as a consequence of institutions following
feedback trading strategies.
Institutional herding, whether it is intentional or unintentional, may induce price pressure and
affect asset prices in a stabilizing or destabilizing manner. For instance, if institutions trade together
based on informational motives, such herding may lead to more efficient markets by enhancing
the adjustment of fundamental information into prices and promoting price discovery (Froot et al.,
1992). Conversely, if institutions systematically disregard their own private information and follow
the crowd, prices may move away from their fundamental values (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990).
The conclusions of the empirical studies regarding the impact of institutional herding on prices is
found to be that stabilizing and destabilizing depends on the time interval considered. For example,
studies examining the relation between institutional herding and returns at quarterly level find that
herding has a stabilizing effect (Wermers, 1999; Sias, 2004). In contrast, studies considering long
time horizons find that institutional herding is associated with reversals in returns (Dasgupta et al.,
2011). Thus, the last hypothesis captures the relation between short-term institutional herding and
returns. A positive (negative) relation between the buy (sell) herding and future returns would
suggest that short-term institutional herding has a stabilizing effect on market prices.
Hypothesis 4: Short-term institutional herding has a stabilizing impact on asset
prices.
3.3 Methodology and Variable Definitions
3.3.1 Herding Measure
The primary herding measure used in this study is the Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992)
(LSV) that detects the empirical herding behavior among market participants. This metric that
has been widely used in the empirical studies (e.g., Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999) captures
the tendency of investors to trade a specific stock together and in the same direction over the same
period, for whatever reason, more often than what would be expected if they trade independently
and randomly. The LSV herding measure for stock i and week t (HMit) is given by
HMit = |brit − brt| − E[|brit − brt|] (3.1)
where brit is the ratio of all institutional investors trading the stock i during week t that are net
buyers and brt is the average of the buyer ratio across all stocks in week t. The LSV measure in
equation (3.1) is a simple ”count” of the number of institutions that are net-buyers in stock i during
week t relative to the total number institutions trading stock i during week t, minus the expected
proportion of buyers. This statistic assumes under the null hypothesis of no herding, the trading
decision whether it is buy or sell has a bernoulli distribution with equal success probability. The
first term of equation 3.1 captures the deviation of the buyer ratio for stock i in week t from the
overall buy probability at week t. Therefore, HMit measures the similarity in the trading patterns
of institutions in excess of market-wide herding. The second term E[|brit − brt|] is an adjustment
factor allowing for random variation around the expected ratio of buyers which ensures that HMit
is zero if the trading decisions are independent (see., Lakonishok et al., 1992).
To investigate the magnitude and the direction of institutional herding as well as its impact on
asset prices I follow Wermers (1999) and use a modified herding measure that distinguishes between
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buy-side and sell-side herding. The buy herding (sell herding) BHMit (SHMit) captures whether
stocks experience a higher (lower) buyer ratio than the average stock during the same week. The
two measures are given as
BHMit = HMit|brit > brt (3.2)
SHMit = HMit|brit < brt (3.3)
To examine the first hypothesis of whether institutional investors engage in herding behavior at
weekly level, I follow Lakonishok et al. (1992) and compute the average LSV measure across all stocks
and over all time periods to obtain the average herding measure HM . A positive and significant
value of HM would be evidence in favor of herding behavior, that is, institutions tend to accumulate
on the same side of the market in their trading decisions. The higher the value of HM the stronger
the herding. For instance, HM = 5% suggests that out of 100 transactions, five more investors trade
on the same side of the market than what would be expected if the trading decisions were random
and independent.
3.3.2 Testing Methodology
Previous studies link institutional herding to the informational environment of the firm and employ
several firm characteristics to proxy for the quality and quantity of available information. For
example, Lakonishok et al. (1992) and Wermers (1999) find the intensity of institutional herding to
be higher among small firms and Wermers (1999) show that the level of mutual funds herding to be
higher among stock experiencing extreme prior-quarter returns. Moreover, Venezia et al. (2011) and
Kremer and Nautz (2013) show that LSV herding measure is positively related to stock volatility
and trading volume.
To examine the second and the third hypotheses, I apply two different approaches. First, I use
a portfolio sort similar to that in Wermers (1999) and assign each stock to one of the five portfolios
formed based on firm size and prior week returns, then I calculate the cross-sectional average of
HM , BHM , and SHM for each quintile and compare these averages for small and large firms as
well as between winners and losers. Second, in a multivariate setting I estimate the following Fama
and MacBeth (1973) regression:
HMit = α+ β1Sizei,t−1 + β2Turnit + β3V olit + β4|ri,t−1|+ εit (3.4)
where HMit is the LSV herding measure for stock i in week t, Sizei,t−1 is the logarithm of the prior
week market capitalization of firm i, Turnit is the average stock turnover for firm i in week t, V olit
captures return volatility, computed as the standard deviation of returns for the past 50 weeks, and
|ri,t−1| is the absolute value of the prior week return, I use the absolute returns because the herding
measure does not distinguish between buy side or sell side. While the second hypothesis implies a
negative relation between firm size and LSV herding measure, the third hypothesis predicts a positive
relation between prior week returns and institutional herding.
The set of variables included in equation (3.4) may influence institutional herding on the buy and
sell side differently. Therefore, I estimate a separate regression for BHMit and SHMit to examine
the impact of each of the variables on institutional buy-herding and sell-herding. Moreover, I replace
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the absolute return |r| by the signed return r since the direction of the recent price movements will
influence whether institutions follow positive feedback trading on the buy or the sell side:
BHMit = α+ β1Sizei,t−1 + β2Turnit + β3V olit + β4ri,t−1
+ βb5Dummy
b
it + εit
(3.5)
SHMit = α+ β1Sizei,t−1 + β2Turnit + β3V olit + β4ri,t−1
+ βs5Dummy
s
it + εit
(3.6)
I also add a dummy variable in both equations Dummybit (Dummy
s
it) to capture whether the insti-
tutions are on the buy-side (sell-side) herding on the prior week.
To test the forth hypothesis, I investigate the relationship between weekly institutional herding
and future returns. Previous studies suggest that if institutions trade stocks in a destabilizing manner
(e.g., Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), stock prices will experience significant reversals. Conversely, if
institutions trade stocks in a stabilizing fashion (Hirshleifer et al., 1994), stock prices will experience
significant continuation. To examine whether institutional herding has a stabilizing or destabilizing
effect, I study the relation between institutional buy and sell herding and future cumulative returns
by estimating the following fixed effect regression:
ri,t,t+n = α+ β1BHMit + β2SHMit + β3Sizei,t + β4V olit
+ β5ri,t,t−2 + β6ri,t,t−24 + εit
(3.7)
where ri,t,t+n is the stock cumulative returns for n = 1, 2, ..., 24 weeks. The independent variables
BHMit and SHMit are the buy and sell institutional herding, Sizei,t is the firm size, V olit is the
return volatility, computed as the standard deviation for the past 50 weeks returns, ri,t,t−2 is the
recent lagged returns from week t− 2 to week t and ri,t,t−24 is the lagged returns from week t− 24
up to week t.
Dasgupta et al. (2011) study the impact of institutional trading on asset prices when institutions
buy or sell the same stocks over multiple quarters. They document a strong long-term return
predictability of institutional trading activity, after controlling for many of the stock characteristics.
They show that persistence in institutional trading is related to return reversals. In particular, stocks
that are sold over multiple quarters by institutional investors outperform stocks bought by them after
a period of 2 years. Similarly, I examine the price impact of the persistence in institutional herding
by following the same approach as in Dasgupta et al. (2011). While these authors examine the price
effects of institutional buying or selling over multiple quarter, this paper focus on the price impact
of the persistence in short-term institutional herding.
First, I follow Brown et al. (2013) and compute an adjusted herding measure to capture the case
where the direction of herding in a given stock changes from one week to another. Specifically, for
each week and each group of buy-herding (sell-herding) stocks, I subtract the minimum value of
BHM (SHM) from each stock’s BHM (SHM), then the adjusted herding measure is set to equal
to the differenced value of BHM if the stock is buy-herding, and to the negative of the differenced
SHM if the stock is sell herding for a given week. Second, I follow Dasgupta et al. (2011) and
define persistence in institutional herding as the number of consecutive weeks in which we observe a
buy-herding or sell herding for the stock. This variable is positive for buy-herding and negative for
sell-herding. For instance, a stock experiencing buy-herding in week t and week t−1 but sell-herding
at week t − 2 has herding persistence of 2, while a stock experiencing sell-herding in week t and
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week t − 1 but buy herding in week t − 2 has herding persistence of -2. The maximum herding
persistence assigned to a stock is 6 (-6). Persistence values of 1 and -1, a stock experiencing buy or
sell herding only in week t, are assigned a value 0. Finally, to examine the link between persistence
in weekly institutional herding and future returns, I follow Dasgupta et al. (2011) and estimate a
cross-sectional regressions of cumulative weekly market adjusted returns on past herding persistence,
past returns, and a variety of stock characteristics. The specification is as follows:
ri,t,t+n = α+ βPersistit + δri,t,t−2 + γri,t,t−24 + λX + εit (3.8)
where ri,t,t+n is the stock cumulative returns over weeks t + 1 to t + n for n = 1, 2, ..., 24 weeks.
The explanatory variable Persistit is persistence in institutional herding, measured as the number of
consecutive weeks in which a stock experience buy or sell herding. The variable ri,t,t−2 is the recent
lagged returns from week t−2 up to week t and the ri,t,t−24 captures the lagged returns up to 24 prior
weeks. The other explanatory variables include stock turnover, firm size, standard deviation of the
past 50 week returns, market return, and prior week log price. To simplify the interpretation of the
coefficient estimates, all the explanatory variables are standardized (to have mean 0 and standard
deviation of 1) using their cross-sectional moments. I estimate the above regression using Fama and
MacBeth (1973) procedure. The t-statistics are calculated from Newey and West (1987) standard
errors adjusting for autocorrelations up to 4 weeks.
3.4 Results
Panel A of Table 3.1 reports the overall level of herding revealed by our sample of institutional
investors. The average herding measure (HM) of 2.5 percent is computed over all stocks-weeks
during the sample period, for stocks that were traded by at least 3 institutions. Panels B and C
show similar level of institutional herding, although slightly higher, across all stocks-weeks traded
by at least 5 and 10 institutions, respectively. The average institutional herding of 2.5 percent
means that if there were 100 institutions trading a given stock in a particular week, then roughly
two more institutions trade on the same side of the market than what would be expected if they
traded randomly and independently. The overall average herding level (2.5 percent) is similar to
that reported by Lakonishok et al. (1992) for their sample of pension funds (2.7 percent) and slightly
less than overall mutual fund herding reported by Wermers (1999) (3.4 percent).
Table 3.1 also examines the overall level of institutional herding by partitioning the sample into
two subperiods (2007 as the break point) as well as whether institutions tend to form the herd on
either side of the market. I choose 2007 as a break point to examine the variations in institutional
herding in the crisis and pre-crisis periods. The results reveal that institutions typically herd on the
buy-side more often than on the sell-side. The overall institutional buy-herding is 2.9 percent, while
the overall institutional sell-herding is 2 percent, and the difference of 0.9 percent is statistically
significant at one percent level. The subperiod results show that institutional investors exhibit
herding behavior in both sub-samples. However, the level of institutional herding is stronger in the
pre-crisis period. The overall herding measure in the pre-crisis period is 3.2 percent, while in the
crisis period is only 1.6 percent. The difference in the level of institutional herding between the
two subperiods is 1.6 percent and is statistically significant at one percent level. These findings are
counterintuitive. We would expect the level of herding to be higher in volatile markets, in particular
on the sell side. However, these results are likely due to the fact that empirical herding measures
represent only the excess trading relative to the overall trend.
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Table 3.1: LSV Herding Measure
The herding measure HMit for a given stock-week equals to |brit − brt| − E[|brit − brt|], where
brit is the ratio of the total number buyer institutions for a given stock-week to overall number
of institutions trading that stock-week. The herding measures HMit, BHMit, and SHMit are
computed for a sample of US institutional investors including 1,142 institutions from January
1, 1999 through September 30, 2011. The herding measure is calculate for a large sample of
stocks listed on Nyse, Nasdaq, and Amex exchanges. Panels A, B, and C present the full sample
average herding measure across all stocks and time periods as well as the average herding
measure before and after 2007 with minimum number of institutions trading a stock-week of 3,
5, and 10, respectively. Standard errors are given in parentheses, number of observations are
(x1000).
Panel A Panel B Panel C
HM BHM SHM HM BHM SHM HM BHM SHM
Full 2.5% 2.9% 2.0% 2.7% 3.0% 2.3% 2.9% 3.2% 2.7%
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Obs 1,204 629 574 1,088 565 522 940 485 454
Y ear < 2007 3.2% 3.6% 2.7% 3.4% 3.7% 3.0% 3.7% 3.9% 3.4%
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Obs 697 364 332 639 334 305 535 278 257
Y ear >= 2007 1.6% 2.1% 1.0% 1.7% 2.1% 1.2% 1.9% 2.2% 1.6%
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Obs 506 265 241 449 232 217 404 207 197
Diff 1.6% 1.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.5% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8%
(82.22) (52.85) (64.33) (92.60) (60.51) (70.73) (92.11) (61.75) (68.64)
The overall results show that there is little evidence of institutional herding at weekly level. These
results are similar to the quarterly findings obtained in the previous studies. Institutions tend to
form the herd more often on the buy-side of the market than the sell-side and the level of herding is
stronger in the pre-crisis period compared to the crisis period.
3.4.1 Institutional Herding and Stock Characteristics
To test hypotheses 2 and 3, I examine the average level of institutional herding (HM) as well as the
average buy-side (BHM) and sell-side (SHM) using a portfolio approach similar to that in Wermers
(1999). First, I independently rank all the stocks in the sample based on the firm size and prior
week returns, then for each quintile I calculate the average institutional herding measures. Next, I
examine the relation between institutional herding and stock characteristics in a multivariate setting
by estimating a Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression of herding measures against firm size and prior
week returns controlling for other firm characteristics such as turnover and stock volatility.
Panel A of Table 3.2 presents the average herding measures across all stock-weeks segregated by
firm size. Size quintile breakpoints are determined by ranking all the stocks in the sample according
to their market capitalization; these breakpoints are updated at the beginning of each week. Looking
first at the results of the unsigned herding measure (HM), Panel A shows that institutions tend to
herd more often in the large firms than in the small firms. The average institutional herding in the
large firms is 3.14 percent, while the average institutional herding in small firms is 2.36 percent;
the difference of 0.78 percent is statistically significant at one percent level. Since the intentional
herding hypothesis implies the herds to form more often in the small firms than in the large firms,
these findings are in favor of the unintentional herding explanation. However, when looking at the
signed herding measures, I find that the herd tend to form more often on the buy-side than on
the sell side in trading the small firms. The institutional buy-herding (BHM) in the small firms
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is 3.32 percent, while the institutional sell-herding (SHM) in the small firms is only 1.17 percent;
the difference of 2.15 percent is statistically significant at one percent level. On the other hand,
institutional herding tends to form more often on the sell-side than on the buy-side in trading the
large firms. The institutional buy-herding in the large firms is 2.23 percent, while the institutional
sell-herding in the large firms is 3.82 percent, the difference is 1.59 percent statistically significant at
one percent level. These weekly results show that institutional investors share preferences for buying
(selling) the small (large) stocks as they tend to pile-up on the buy-side (sell-side) of the market in
trading the small (large) stocks.
Panel B of Table 3.2 reports the average institutional herding across all stock-weeks for quintiles
based on the prior week stock returns. The quintile breakpoints are determined by all stocks in the
sample and update weekly. The presented results are for the overall institutional herding (HM)
as well as institutional buy (BHM) and sell (SHM) herding. The results show that the overall
institutional herding is roughly the same among the loser and winner stocks. The average institu-
tional herding among the losers is 2.53 percent, while the average institutional herding among the
winners is 2.69 percent. In addition, the herd tends to form more often on the buy-side in trading
the winners than the losers; the difference is statistically significant but small in magnitude. There
is no significant difference in institutional sell herding in trading winner and loser stocks.
Table 3.2: Herding Measures Segregated By Firm Size and Prior Week Returns Quintile
The herding measure HMit for a given stock-week equals to |brit − brt| − E[|brit − brt|], where
brit is the ratio of the total number of buyer institutions for a given stock-week to overall
number of institutions trading that stock-week. The herding measures HMit, BHMit, and
SHMit are computed for a sample of US institutional investors including 1,142 institutions
from January 1, 1999 through September 30, 2011. The herding measure is calculate for a large
sample of stocks listed on Nyse, Nasdaq, and Amex exchanges. Panel A reports the average
herding measures across all stock-weeks belonging to different quintile formed by firms’ market
capitalization. Panel B reports these averages for quintile formed based on stocks’ prior week.
The last line of each panel provide the differences between BHMit and SHMit for each quintile
and the corresponding t-statistic based on paired t-test. The last column of each panel provide
the differences between BHMit (SHMit) for the top and bottom quintile and corresponding
t-statistic based on paired t-test.
Panel A S 2 3 4 L Diff
HM 2.36% 2.30% 2.27% 2.38% 3.14% 0.78%
(25.32)
BHM 3.32% 3.40% 3.02% 2.52% 2.23% -1.09%
(-23.66)
SHM 1.17% 0.85% 1.32% 2.24% 3.82% 2.65%
(63.23)
Diff 2.15% 2.55% 1.69% 0.28% -1.59%
t-stat (40.4) (53.92) (40.13) (7.39) (-49.63)
Panel B L 2 3 4 W
HM 2.53% 2.39% 2.37% 2.46% 2.69% 0.16%
(5.23)
BHM 2.97% 2.84% 2.74% 2.88% 3.26% 0.29%
(6.61)
SHM 2.05% 1.89% 1.96% 2.02% 2.07% 0.02%
(0.43)
Diff 0.92% 0.95% 0.78% 0.86% 1.19%
t-stat (20.88) (22.46) (18.61) (20.36) (26.97)
While the previous analysis controls for firm size and prior week returns, institutional herding is
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likely to be influenced by other stock characteristics. Therefore, I further test hypotheses 2 and 3 in
a multivariate setting by regressing the herding measures against firm size and prior week returns
controlling for stock volatility and turnover as well as dummy variables to control for the persistence
in herding measures and to identify the direction of herding in the prior week. Table 3.3 presents
the weekly Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions results for equations (3.4), (3.5), and (3.6). The
first column reports regression results for the unsigned herding measure (HM), while the second
and third columns report regression estimates for buy-side (BHM) and sell-side (SHM) herding
measures, respectively.
Looking first at the results of the unsigned herding measure, I find that the coefficient estimate
for the firm size is positive and statistically significant at one percent level. The fact that institu-
tional herding increases with the firm size is consistent with the unintentional herding hypothesis
as the quantity and quality of information about large firms is higher. Moreover, the positive and
significant loading for the stock turnover gives further evidence for the unintentional hypothesis since
higher trading volume should be associated with higher information quality and lower asymmetric
information. The parameter estimate for the absolute returns is positive and significant at one per-
cent level indicating that institutions engage in feedback trading strategies, i.e., the herd is more
likely to buy past winners and sell past losers which is consistent with the unintentional herding.
Finally, the positive relation between institutional herding and stock volatility suggests that there is
more herding among volatile stocks, which hints at intentional herding hypothesis. However, in the
following I estimate the impact of volatility on buy and sell herding separately and provide different
explanation.
Table 3.3: Institutional Herding and Stock Characteristics
The herding measure HMit for a given stock-week equals to |brit − brt| − E[|brit − brt|], where
brit is the ratio of the total number buyer institutions for a given stock-week to overall number
of institutions trading that stock-week. The herding measures HMit, BHMit, and SHMit are
computed for a sample of US institutional investors including 1,142 institutions from January
1, 1999 through September 30, 2011. The herding measure is calculate for a large sample of
stocks listed on Nyse, Nasdaq, and Amex exchanges. Stock turnover is calculated as the ratio of
total trading volume to number of shares outstanding, Size is the log of market capitalization,
σ is the standard deviation of weekly stock return in the past 50 weeks, ri,t−2 is the cumulative
two weeks lagged return, DummyB (DummyS) is a dummy variable capturing whether the
stock experience buy (sell) herding in the previous week. The dependent variable and all the
independent variables are standardized to facilitate the interpretation. The coefficients are
estimated using Fama and MacBeth (1973). t-statistics, in parentheses, are calculated from
Newey and West (1987) standard errors adjusting for autocorrelations up to 4 weeks.
HM BHM SHM
Size 0.0471 -0.0076 0.0848
(23.28) (-3.46) (29.27)
Turnover 0.0273 0.0152 0.0584
(18.4) (10.07) (29.63)
σi,t,t−50 0.0111 0.0107 -0.0053
(6.12) (5.7) (-2.48)
|ri,t−1| 0.0069
(5.11)
ri,t−1 0.0243 -0.0138
(14.37) (-6.85)
Dummyb 0.2191
(32.48)
Dummys 0.2444
(81.85)
Cons -0.0150 -0.1382 -0.1166
(-9.08) (-63.52) (-55.09)
The second and third columns of Table 3.3 report the estimated coefficients for equation (3.5) and
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(3.6). The negative and significant coefficient on firm size suggests that institutional buy-herding
is significantly stronger among the small firms. In contrast, the degree of institutional sell-herding
is significantly stronger among the large firms. These findings are consistent with the univariate
analysis discussed previously. Consequently, there is an asymmetric effect of stock volatility on both
buy and sell herding. On one hand, the impact of volatility on (BHM) is positive and statistically
significant suggesting that the higher the volatility, the higher the institutional herding on the buy-
side. On the other hand, the impact of volatility on (SHM) is significantly negative indicating that
there is higher institutional sell-herding in the less volatile stocks. This asymmetric effect of volatility
on institutional buy and sell herding is not compatible with the intentional herding such that the
return volatility should affect both buy and sell herding in the same way. Apparently, institutions
share common preferences for buying (selling) small (large) stocks and stocks have experienced high
(low) volatility. This is a clear indication of the unintentional herding that could result from common
risk management practices. Additionally, the impact of prior week returns on buy (sell) herding is
positive (negative) and statistically significant at one percent level suggesting that the herd engages
in feedback trading strategies which is also in favor of the unintentional herding behavior.
3.4.2 Price Impact of Institutional Herding
In this section, I investigate the impact of institutional buy and sell herding on asset prices. In
particular, I estimate a fixed effect regression of the future cumulative returns against BHM and
SHM controlling for various stock characteristics as well as time dummies. Table 3.4 summarizes
the main estimation results of equation (3.7) for a set of cumulative returns computed up to 24
weeks in the future. The results show that there is asymmetric relation between institutional buy
and sell herding and future returns. On one hand, the strong positive relation between institutional
buy herding and cumulative returns suggests that institutions on the buy-side correctly predict
the future price movements up to eight weeks. The strong positive relation fades away in week
12 and becomes negative but insignificant in week 24. Accordingly, there is no evidence of return
reversals, therefore, there is no indication of a destabilizing effect. On the other hand, institutional
sell herding is associated with significant return reversals. While the relation between institutional
sell herding and cumulative returns is negative in the short-term, this relation changes its sign and
becomes positive and significant starting from week 8. The fact that stocks heavily sold by the herd
experience price reversals is consistent with the destabilizing hypothesis of institutional herding, such
that, the herd on the sell-side pushes prices below their fundamental values, thus, experiencing price
correction in the subsequent periods.
The price continuations (reversals) following the buy (sell) herding are consistent with the results
of the previous studies regarding the asymmetric impact of institutional buy and sell trades on prices.
The main conclusions of these studies are as follow: (i) institutional buy trades have a permanent
impact on prices therefore stock prices continue to increase following the buy trades (ii) institutional
sell trades have a temporary effect on prices and therefore price corrections over the following period
take place. The interpretation of these finding is that institutional buy trades convey information thus
more informative than the sell trades. The fact that institutional buy herding is more concentrated
among the small stocks than the large stocks is consistent with information hypothesis. Therefore,
stocks heavily bought by the herd experience price continuations. Conversely, institutional sell
herding is concentrated among the large stocks which operate in less opaque environment, hence,
the herd forms on the sell side for non-informational reasons and therefore stocks sold by the herd
experience price reversals.
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Table 3.4: The Impact of BHM and SHM on Asset Prices
The herding measure HMit for a given stock-week equals to |brit − brt| − E[|brit − brt|], where
brit is the ratio of the total number buyer institutions for a given stock-week to overall number
of institutions trading that stock-week. The herding measures HMit, BHMit, and SHMit are
computed for a sample of US institutional investors including 1,142 institutions from January
1, 1999 through September 30, 2011. The herding measure is calculate for a large sample of
stocks listed on Nyse, Nasdaq, and Amex exchanges. Stock turnover is the ratio of stock daily
trading volume to number of shares outstanding, Size is the log of market capitalization, σ is
the standard deviation of weekly stock return in the past 50 weeks, ri,t,t−2 is the cumulative
two weeks lagged return, ri,t,t−24 is the cumulative returns for the past 24 weeks, Ln(price) is
the log price at the end of previous week. All regressions include firm fixed effects and time
dummies. Standard errors are clustered by firm. t-statistics are given in parentheses.
ri,t+1 ri,t,t+2 ri,t,t+3 ri,t,t+4 ri,t,t+8 ri,t,t+12 ri,t,t+24
BHM 0.0088 0.0124 0.0121 0.0123 0.0092 0.0025 -0.0048
(11.13) (10.66) (8.43) (7.2) (3.68) (0.8) (-1.04)
SHM -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.0038 -0.0015 0.0110 0.0234 0.0413
(-6.14) (-3.97) (-2.16) (-0.73) (3.5) (6.00) (7.14)
Size -0.0065 -0.0120 -0.0171 -0.0227 -0.0407 -0.0560 -0.1080
(-10.83) (-10.87) (-10.74) (-10.86) (-10.33) (-9.84) (-9.96)
Turnover -0.0127 -0.0308 -0.0551 -0.1029 -0.2642 -0.3402 -0.6510
(-1.23) (-1.85) (-2.37) (-3.42) (-3.62) (-3.45) (-3.56)
σi,t,t−50 0.0443 0.0862 0.1266 0.1701 0.3329 0.4648 0.8852
(7.89) (8.12) (8.27) (8.41) (8.3) (8.03) (8.39)
ri,t,t−2 -0.0233 -0.0338 -0.0410 -0.0453 -0.0919 -0.1229 -0.1775
(-17.59) (-15.42) (-15.31) (-15.12) (-21.04) (-22.75) (-23.55)
ri.t.t−24 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0018 -0.0031 0.0010 -0.0100
(-1.78) (-1.48) (-1.09) (-1.4) (-1.23) (0.3) (-1.76)
Ln(price) -0.0045 -0.0097 -0.0153 -0.0200 -0.0415 -0.0636 -0.1222
(-7.06) (-8.38) (-9.17) (-9.14) (-10.02) (-10.65) (-10.84)
cons 0.1583 0.2895 0.4037 0.5200 0.9687 1.3525 2.7681
(13.95) (13.86) (13.56) (13.36) (13.21) (12.8) (13.74)
Dasgupta et al. (2011) document that persistence in institutional herding is a strong predictor
of the cross-sectional returns at long intervals. More specifically, institutional trade persistence is
related to return reversals such that stocks persistently sold by institutions over 3 to 5 quarters
outperform stocks bought by them after a period of about two years. The argument is based on
the theoretical models of herding (e.g., Scharfstein and Stein (1990); Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and
Welch (1992)). In this models, when investors decide to take a certain action over multiple periods,
other investors mimic their actions, creating persistence in investment decisions over time. Based
on the predictions of the theoretical models and empirical findings found at long-term horizon, I
investigate the impact of persistence in the short-term institutional herding on asset prices. In
particular, I examine the impact of institutional buy and sell herding over multiple weeks (three to
six week) on a set of future cumulative returns.
Table 3.5 reports the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression results of equation (3.8) for a set of
future cumulative returns computed up to 24 weeks. The first two columns of Table 3.5 shows that
persistence in institutional herding over 3 to 6 weeks significantly predicts the cumulative returns
over the next two weeks. However, when looking at the last three columns, it can be seen that the
persistence in institutional herding significantly predicts return reversals. Stocks that are sold by
the herd over multiple weeks outperform the stocks bought by them over the next 8 to 24 weeks.
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Table 3.5: The Relation between Herding Persistence and Returns
The herding measure HMit for a given stock-week equals to |brit − brt| − E[|brit − brt|], where
brit is the ratio of the total number buyer institutions for a given stock-week to overall number
of institutions trading that stock-week. The herding measures HMit, BHMit, and SHMit are
computed for a sample of US institutional investors including 1,142 institutions from January
1, 1999 through September 30, 2011. The herding measure is calculate for a large sample of
stocks listed on Nyse, Nasdaq, and Amex exchanges. Stock turnover is the ratio of stock daily
trading volume to number of shares outstanding, Size is the log of market capitalization, σ is
the standard deviation of weekly stock return in the past 50 weeks, ri,t,t−2 is the cumulative
two weeks lagged return, ri,t,t−24 is the cumulative returns for the past 24 weeks, Ln(price) is
the log price at the end of previous week, and mktRet is the market return. The coefficients
are estimated using Fama and MacBeth (1973). t-statistics, in parentheses, are calculated from
the Newey and West (1987) standard errors adjusting for autocorrelations up to 4 weeks.
ri,t+1 ri,t,t+2 ri,t,t+3 ri,t,t+4 ri,t,t+8 ri,t,t+12 ri,t,t+24
Persist 0.0006 0.0005 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0018 -0.0041
(6.95) (3.88) (1.67) (0.13) (-2.23) (-4.32) (-6.22)
Turnover 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0013 -0.0024 -0.0071
(1.67) (1) (0.62) (-0.04) (-1.74) (-2.34) (-4.25)
Size 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0027
(0.27) (0.35) (-0.04) (-0.27) (-0.13) (-0.21) (-0.88)
σi,t,t−50 0.0002 0.0007 0.0011 0.0018 0.0041 0.0070 0.0218
(0.81) (1.49) (1.62) (2.02) (2.71) (3.61) (6.05)
ri,t,t−2 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0034 -0.0025
(-6.57) (-5.02) (-4.25) (-3.33) (-4.23) (-5.5) (-2.24)
ri.t.t−24 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0006 -0.0010 -0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0122
(-0.93) (-0.78) (-0.96) (-1.19) (-1.99) (-2.37) (-4.77)
Ln(price) -0.0019 -0.0038 -0.0055 -0.0072 -0.0140 -0.0202 -0.0402
(-9.93) (-10.43) (-10.21) (-10.26) (-11.17) (-11.64) (-13.7)
mktRet -0.0547 -0.0353 -0.0783 -0.1261 -0.0544 -0.1789 0.1112
(-3.62) (-1.53) (-3.34) (-4.23) (-1.44) (-3.77) (1.47)
cons 0.0021 0.0052 0.0078 0.0109 0.0210 0.0319 0.0697
(4.27) (5.38) (5.48) (5.66) (6.79) (7.83) (10.41)
A one-standard deviation increase in herding persistence predicts in future returns of about 0.4%,
net of the effects of all control variables. These results are in accordance with the findings found
at long-term horizons. In particular, the persistence in institutional herding at weekly horizons is a
significant predictor of return reversals.
In sum, the overall results suggest that whether institutional herding is intentional or uninten-
tional has an impact on stock prices. While the buy herding is positively associated with the future
returns, the sell herding is associated with return reversals. Moreover, institutional investors buying
or selling a stock over multiple weeks leads to return reversals, that is, persistence in the invest-
ment decisions by institutional investors push prices away from their fundamental values, thus, price
corrections occurs after a period of at least 8 weeks.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter I shed more light on the importance of the short-term institutional herding by
using a database of institutional transactions from the U.S. market that include high-frequency and
institutional investor-level data. The data covers a long period of time from January 1999 through
September 2011. The chapter provides empirical evidence on the short-term institutional herding,
the impact of institutional herding as well as herding persistence on asset prices. Consistent with
the quarterly findings, I find weak evidence of institutional herding at weekly level. The overall
level of institutional herding at weekly horizon is 2.5%. The overall results are consistent with the
unintentional herding explanation. While institutions on the buy side share common preferences
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for small and volatile stocks, the sell side herding is common among large and less risky stocks.
Institutional buy and sell herding affect prices differently. While the buy-side institutional herding
has a stabilizing effect on prices, the sell-side affects prices in a destabilizing way. Finally, consistent
with the long-term findings, the persistence of institutional herding at weekly levels is associated to
return reversals.
Chapter 4
The Dynamics of Institutional
Trading: Evidence from
Transaction Data
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4.1 Introduction
The institutional ownership of U.S. equities has grown considerably in the past decades. The fraction
of equity shares held by institutions has increased from 16.2 % in 1965 to 50.2% in 2010 (Federal
Reserve Board, 2011). The rapid growth of institutional shareholdings and sheer magnitude of in-
stitutional trading activity have induced numerous empirical and theoretical papers on the trading
behavior of institutional investors. Because institutions are required to disclose their portfolio hold-
ings only at a quarterly frequency, extant empirical studies rely on quarterly or annual data to
examine the dynamic relation between changes in institutional ownership and same-period returns.
The main findings of these studies can be summarized as follows: (i) institutional investors are
momentum traders (Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Bennett, Sias, and Starks, 2003; Sias,
2007), (ii) Institutional investors often allegedly follow each other and engage in herding behavior
(Wermers, 1999), and (iii) there exists a strong positive contemporaneous relation between changes
in institutional ownership and returns (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Wermers, 1999). Although the con-
temporaneous relation between changes in institutional ownership and returns is well documented
in the literature, the economic mechanisms behind this relation have received less attention and
require higher frequency data on institutional ownership to investigate them. In this chapter, I use
detailed transaction data for a sample of U.S. institutional investors to investigate the sources of this
contemporaneous relation found at quarterly and yearly intervals. In particular, I examine the daily
and intradaily cross−sectional relationship between the trading activity of institutional investors and
stock returns.
The contemporaneous relation between changes in institutional ownership and same-period re-
turns is consistent with three main hypotheses (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias et al., 2006): (1)
the aggregate institutional buying and selling activities have a contemporaneous impact on prices
(price pressure); (2) institutional investors are short-term momentum traders; and (3) institutional
investors possess superior information that allows them to time their trades (i.e., institutions are able
to forecast short-term returns). Without higher frequency institutional ownership data, examining
these competing explanations is a difficult task. However, with daily and intradaily institutional
transaction data, testing each hypothesis is straightforward. For example, if the quarterly (daily)
contemporaneous relation arises from institutional investors following momentum trading strategies
at intra-quarterly (intradaily) horizon, we should observe institutional trades chasing the intra-
quarterly (intradaily) asset prices. Alternatively, if the quarterly (daily) contemporaneous relation
arises due to institutional investors’ ability to predict intra-quarter (intradaily) returns, institutional
trading activity would lead price movements. Finally, it is also possible that the contemporane-
ous relation at the quarterly (daily) intervals arises from the price impact of institutional trades,
thus, a contemporaneous relation at daily or weekly (intradaily) frequency should be observed. The
trade−to−trade institutional data allows us to examine the short-term relationship between stock
returns and institutional investors’ trades and provide empirical evidence on the relative importance
of each hypothesis in inducing the contemporaneous relation between institutional ownership and
returns found at quarterly and yearly intervals. Understanding the sources of the contemporane-
ous relation between the changes in institutional ownership and same-period returns is important
because each of the competing explanations has different interpretations of whether aggregate insti-
tutional buying and selling activities affect asset prices and whether asset prices can affect aggregate
institutional activity.
I first start analyzing the relationship between returns and institutional trading activity at daily
frequency using portfolio sort and vector autoregression techniques. The results of the daily analysis
suggest that the quarterly contemporaneous relationship is mainly driven by institutions following
feedback trading strategies but not the institutional ability to predict returns. However, I also find
a strong contemporaneous relationship between institutional trade imbalances and returns at daily
horizon, which may hint at price impact of institutional trades. Therefore, I examine the relation
between returns and institutional imbalances at intradaily level to identify the primary explanation
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for the contemporaneous relation found at daily level.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, I find that the contemporaneous relation is
primarily driven by the institutional investors following prices at daily and intradaily level. Second,
I investigate the potential explanations of the contemporaneous relation by using actual transaction
data for a sample of U.S. institutional investors for a period from 1999 through September 2011.
This study overcomes the limitations of quarterly institutional ownership data used in the previous
studies and employs a proprietary database of institutional trades obtained from ANcerno Ltd. The
ANcerno data provides a unique opportunity to examine the daily and intradaily relation between
institutional trading activity and returns, since the dataset contains a detailed information on insti-
tutional transaction that account for nearly 8% of the total trading volume of CRSP in each of the
years of our study. There are several advantages of working with ANcerno’s data; for example, we
can distinguish between the trades of institutional and retail investors. It also provides information
on the side of the transaction (whether it is buy or sell), number of shares traded by each institution,
date and time stamps for each trade, and a unique numerical identification that serves to track the
trades of each institution both in cross-section and over time. It is important to note that our anal-
ysis for the relationship between institutional imbalances and returns is cross-sectional as I remove
market-wide effects from both variables.
The current study is not the first to examine the short−term relationship between returns and
institutional trading activity. Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu (2003) examine the daily and intradaily
relation between returns and institutional trade imbalances, defined as the difference between insti-
tutional buying and selling activity divided by the number of shares outstanding, using transaction
data for Nasdaq 100 securities. These authors employ portfolio sort, vector autoregression, and
examine institutional imbalances and returns around extreme returns and institutional imbalances.
They document a strong positive relationship between institutional imbalances and the contempo-
raneous and prior day’s returns. However, there are two noteworthy differences between this paper
and the one by Griffin et al. (2003). First, in this chapter I examine the trading behavior of a large
sample of institutional investors, a comprehensive sample of stocks listed on NYSE, Amex, and Nas-
daq, and a long period from 1999 through 2011, while the study by Griffin et al. (2003) covers only
Nasdaq 100 stocks for 210 trading days (May 1, 2000 to February 28, 2001). Second, Griffin et al.
(2003) study the trading behavior of institutional and retail investors; they classify each trade as
initiated by individuals or institutional investors based on whether the market maker primarily deals
with institutional or individual investors. While they show that their classification is robust, it is an
imperfect proxy for institutional trading activity. On the other hand, I focus on the trading behavior
of institutional investors using actual institutional transactional data. Therefore, the findings of this
study are important because it covers a larger sample of firms underlying the potential differences in
the characteristics of institutional trading across different exchanges, longer time period, and most
importantly it uses a better proxy of institutional trading activity.
I summarize the main findings as follows. First, I find a strong positive relationship between
institutional buy−sell imbalances and returns at daily level. Second, institutional investors follow
past price movements. The difference in returns between the high institutional imbalance decile and
low institutional imbalance decile is a statistically significant 0.884% on the day before portfolio
formations and a significant 0.411% two days before portfolio formation. Results from vector au-
toregression analysis suggest that a one standard deviation increase in daily returns lead to a 0.04
standard deviation increase in institutional imbalance on the subsequent day, and institutional trad-
ing is highly autocorrelated at one-day lag. Third, there is a strong time variation in institutional
momentum trading among loser and winner stocks. Forth, the results of the intradaily analysis
suggest that the contemporaneous relation found at daily level between institutional imbalances and
returns is primarily driven by institutional trades following the intradaily prices. Finally, there is no
evidence on short−term institutional investors’ ability to predict returns.
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follow. Section 4.2 presents the related literature.
Section 4.3 develop the main hypotheses, methodology used to investigate the relation between
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institutional trades and contemporaneous and past returns at the daily. Section 4.4 examine some
alternative explanations and provide some robustness tests for the daily results. Section 4.5 provides
an intradaily analysis. Reversals in Section 4.6. A brief conclusion in Section 4.7.
4.2 Related Literature
There is a growing body of literature on the trading behavior of institutional investors. Broadly
speaking, this literature falls into three major groups: (1) papers studying the relation between
institutional trading activity and past returns, (2) studies examining institutional investors’ ability
to predict future returns, and (3) those investigating the contemporaneous relationship between stock
returns and changes in institutional ownership.
The first group of studies investigates the relation between institutional trading activity and past
stock returns as well as the interaction between investors. Momentum trading arises when investors
buy (sell) today in response to an increase (decrease) in recent prices. Theoretical models of investor
behavior (e.g., DeLong et al. (1990); Hong and Stein (1999)) postulate that trading by one class of
investors can lead to momentum in stock prices. These models allow explicitly for the presence of
rational agents to follow prices. Empirical studies examining the trading behavior of institutional
investors primarily use the changes in quarterly institutional holdings. Lakonishok et al. (1992)
examine the quarterly holdings of a sample of pension funds and document a weak evidence of
positive feedback trading or herding behavior. Grinblatt et al. (1995) analyze the trading behavior
of 274 mutual funds and document a stronger evidence of momentum trading and Badrinath and
Wahal (2002) show that the tendency of momentum trading varies considerably across institutional
types and is mainly driven by new equity positions. Using daily data, Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999)
document a herding behavior and feedback trading by Korean and foreign institutional investors.
Conversely, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) document a contrarian investing strategies by the Finnish
institutional investors.
The second group of studies investigates whether managers possess superior skills and abilities
to forecast future price movements. Chen, Jegadeesh, and Wermers (2000) document that stocks
purchased by fund managers outperform stocks sold by them by approximately 2% per year after
controlling for various stock characteristics. On the other hand, Griffin et al. (2003) find no evidence
of return predictability at a daily level, but their findings indicate that institutional trades precedes
stock price movements at intradaily level. However, this effect is economically small.
A third group of papers investigates the sources of the strong positive contemporaneous relation-
ship between changes in institutional ownership and stock returns measured over the same period
(quarterly and yearly). Sias, Starks, and Titman (2006) investigate the drivers of the contempo-
raneous relation by using a covariance decomposition methodology to estimate higher frequency
correlations between unobservable monthly (weekly) changes in institutional holding and lead, lag,
and contemporaneous monthly (weekly) returns. They conclude that the impact of institutional
trades on prices is the primary explanation. However, Cai and Zheng (2004) conclude that stock
returns Granger-cause quarterly changes of institutional ownership, but ownership changes do not
predict stock returns. While both studies shed light on the relation between changes in institutional
ownership and returns found at quarterly horizon, the exact nature of the intra-period relation can-
not be known without higher frequency data. The higher frequency institutional transaction data
permit us to examine these competing hypotheses and in the process, provide new evidence on the
relation between daily institutional trades and past stock returns, price pressure, and the short-term
forecasting ability of institutional trading activity.
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4.3 Returns and Institutional Trading Relation
Empirical studies usually evaluate the relationship between institutional trading and returns using
quarterly data. In this section, I develop the main hypotheses for the potential drivers of the strong
positive contemporaneous relation between returns and changes in institutional ownership. Next,
I explain the methodology used to examine the relation between institutional trading activity and
returns at daily level. Finally, I present the empirical results.
4.3.1 Hypotheses
The contemporaneous relation between the changes in quarterly institutional ownership and quar-
terly returns is consistent with the institutional price pressure hypothesis. There are two possible
explanations for why institutional trades may have a direct impact on asset prices. First, institutional
investors are better informed than other investors, thus their trades reveal valuable information and
consequently have a permanent effect on prices (Easley and O’Hara (1987)). Second, it is possible
that the aggregate institutional trading requires price concession, therefore, driving away the liq-
uidity suppliers from their optimal inventory positions which result in a temporary effect on prices
(Stoll, 1978; Grossman and Miller, 1988). The empirical studies on the institutional price pressure
show that institutional trading activities have both permanent and short-lived impacts on prices
(e.g., Lakonishok et al., 1992; Chan and Lakonishok, 1993, 1995; Keim and Madhavan, 1997). Ad-
ditionally, Edelen and Warner (2001) show that both the aggregate flow into U.S. equity funds and
institutional trading activities affect security prices. They find that the price impact of aggregate
institutional trades is similar in magnitude to that of the individual institutional trades. Since the
price impact of institutional trading is well document in the literature the current study investigates
the other two possible explanations for the strong positive contemporaneous relation between re-
turns and changes in institutional ownership found at quarterly level, namely short-term momentum
trading and returns predictability.
It is possible that the contemporaneous relation between quarterly returns and changes in insti-
tutional ownership is driven by institutional investors following short-term (intra-quarter) positive
feedback trading strategies. This explanation is consistent with the theoretical models of investors’
overreaction and/or investors’ underreaction. These models suggest that sophisticated investors, such
as hedge funds and mutual funds, may rationally engage in momentum trading strategies to exploit
these overreaction and/or underreaction by other investors (DeLong et al., 1990; Hong and Stein,
1999). Furthermore, institutional feedback trading could also arise if institutions provide liquidity to
other market participants who follow contrarian investment strategies (Barber et al., 2009b). Con-
sistent with this reasoning, the first hypothesis captures the idea that institutional investors tend to
buy stocks that performed well and sell the stocks that performed poorly in the recent past implying
that returns will lead institutional trading activity.
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between institutional trade imbalances and
prior day returns.
The second potential explanation for the positive contemporaneous relation between changes in
institutional holding and same-quarter returns is also consistent with the hypothesis that institutional
investors possess superior information and are able to predict the short-term returns. Therefore,
stocks that institutional investors buy would outperform the stocks that they sell. The empirical
evidence indicates that there is a weak positive relationship between aggregate institutional demand
and future returns (Wermers, 1999, 2000; Bennett et al., 2003). These findings suggest that, at least
in part, the quarterly contemporaneous relation between changes in institutional ownership and
returns can be explained by the ability of institutional investors to predict short-term intraquarter
returns. Thus, the second hypothesis captures the idea that institutional trade imbalances are
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positively associated with daily future returns. This hypothesis implies that the daily institutional
imbalances would lead the returns.
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between institutional trade imbalances and
the following day returns.
4.3.2 Variable Definition
The primary measure of stock−level institutional trading activity is calculated based on the daily
institutional trading imbalance. In particular, for each firm i I compute the institutional buy−sell
imbalance as the total daily volume of shares bought by institutions less the total daily volume of
shares sold by institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding:
Imbali,t =
InstitBuyi,t − InstitSelli,t
Shareoutstandi,t
(4.1)
where Imbali,t is institutional imbalance for stock i in day t, InstitBuyi,t is the total institutional
buy volume for stock i in day t, InstitSelli,t is the total institutional sell volume for stock i in day
t, and Shareoutstandi,t is the total number of shares outstanding of stock i on day t.
For each stock in the sample, I subtract from both daily stock returns and institutional imbalances
an equally weighted average return and institutional imbalance, respectively to minimize market
wide-effects.
4.3.3 Testing Methodology and Empirical Results
To investigate the daily relation between the trading activity of institutional investors and returns,
I start the analysis by using a sorting method similar to that used by Nofsinger and Sias (1999) and
Griffin et al. (2003) and assign stocks each day into one of the ten portfolios based on the intensity
of the daily institutional buy−sell imbalances. Where the stocks assigned to the first decile are
those experiencing the largest institutional selling activity and stocks in the top decile are those
experiencing the largest institutional buying activity.
Table 4.1 reports the average stock characteristics across the ten portfolios sorted by their daily
institutional buy−sell imbalance. I calculate the average volatility (standard deviation of daily
returns during a quarter), firm size (market capitalization), turnover (total daily trading volume
divided by number of shares outstanding), daily price level, daily raw returns, and daily institutional
buy−sell imbalance. Each average is computed as the average of daily cross-sectional mean for stock
characteristic in each decile. I start the analysis by examining price levels across the ten portfolios
because big differences in prices may have a crucial influence on result inferences (Badrinath and
Wahal, 2002). For instance, the formation of each portfolio based on institutional buy−sell imbalance
gives each stock equal weight, therefore 10% increase in the trading of a stock traded at $10 per
share is given the same weight as a 10% increase in the trading of a stock traded at $100 per
share. Table 4.1 shows some differences in price level across institutional buy-sell portfolios, the
average prices are higher for extreme groups ranging from $30.59 − $33.64. However, the variation
in price levels across the ten groups is quite small, suggesting that giving equal weights to each stock
when forming the ten portfolios is not likely to bias the results in decile formation. The typical
stock size traded by ANcerno clients is approximately $4.5 billion with relatively higher volatility
(smaller firms), suggesting that the largest fraction of institutional trading is not observed among the
largest capitalization firms. This is in accordance with Bennett, Sias, and Starks (2003), who find
that institutional investors increased their preferences for smaller and riskier securities. Moreover,
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institutional buying and selling activity is observed among stock with high turnover. Finally, while
stocks that institutions tend to sell experience negative returns, the stocks institutions tend to buy
experience positive returns.
Table 4.1: Stock Characteristics by Institutional Buy-Sell Imbalance
This table reports average security characteristics across 10 portfolios sorted by their daily
institutional buy-sell imbalances. Stock returns are expressed in percentage per day. Market
capitalization is reported in billions of dollars. Volatility is computed as the standard deviation
of daily return during a quarter. Turnover is calculated as the total daily volume divided
by number of shares outstanding (in percentage). Institutional imbalance is computed as the
difference between daily institutional buy and sell and is expressed in percentage. Price is the
daily market price.
Return Price Turnover Volatility Cap Inst.Imbal
D 1 -0.5581 33.23 0.0192 0.0297 4.67 -0.3328
D 2 -0.2849 33.03 0.0119 0.0266 8.25 -0.0792
D 3 -0.1521 33.51 0.0101 0.0255 11.81 -0.0319
D 4 -0.0639 32.63 0.0089 0.0249 13.34 -0.0109
D 5 0.0038 30.59 0.0080 0.0251 10.64 -0.0015
D 6 0.0645 31.14 0.0082 0.0250 10.76 0.0044
D 7 0.1271 32.52 0.0091 0.0251 12.11 0.0148
D 8 0.2343 32.87 0.0102 0.0258 10.27 0.0369
D 9 0.3967 32.37 0.0120 0.0270 7.24 0.0856
D 10 0.6967 33.64 0.0193 0.0301 4.20 0.3340
4.3.4 The Contemporaneous Relationship
Most of the existing empirical studies evaluate institutional trading behavior by examining the
quarterly changes in institutional ownership. However, with the exception of the study by Griffin
et al. (2003) and a short analysis in Nofsinger and Sias (1999), little is known about the short-term
relation between institutional trading and returns in U.S. market.
Table 4.2 reports the time series average of the daily cross-sectional mean abnormal returns
and institutional trading imbalances for firms within each institutional trading imbalance decile. In
the formation day, stocks in the decile experiencing the largest institutional buying activity exhibit
average excess return (relative to equally-weighted market return) of 0.626 percent, statistically
different from zero at one percent level. Alternatively, stocks in the decile experiencing the largest
institutional selling activity exhibit average excess return of −0.611 percent, again different from zero
at one the percent level. The stocks experiencing strong institutional buying activity outperform
the ones experiencing strong institutional selling activity by 1.24 percent per day, the difference is
statistically significant at the one percent level. Griffin et al. (2003) report a difference of 7.98% for
Nasdaq securities, while Nofsinger and Sias (1999) report a difference of 2.68% for 114 NYSE firms
for a three months’ period. Our finding is smaller in magnitude in comparison to both studies, likely
because our sample covers longer time period, larger sample including firms listed on NYSE, Amex,
and Nasdaq, smaller and less liquid firms. In unreported results, I find a considerable time variation
in the returns differentials between stocks experiencing large institutional buying activity and stocks
experiencing large institutional selling activity. While the return difference between top and bottom
decile peaks in 2008 reaching 2% per day, the return differential is only 0.86% per day in 2004. I also
estimate a daily cross-sectional regression of returns on institutional trading, firm size, turnover, and
stock volatility and find that the strong contemporaneous relation between returns and institutional
trading imbalances is not affected by controlling for these firm characteristics.
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Table 4.2: Returns and Institutional Buy-Sell Imbalances for Portfolios Classified by
Institutional Buy-Sell Imbalance
On each day the NASDAQ-AMEX-NYSE stocks are ranked by their daily institutional
buy-sell imbalances and assigned to one of 10 portfolios. For each stock, institutional buy-sell
imbalance (expressed in percent) is the difference between the institutional buy and sell
volumes for that day scaled by the total number of outstanding shares. This table reports
the time-series averages of lagged and contemporaneous institutional buy-sell imbalances and
the difference between the return and the equal-weighted NASDAQ-AMEX-NYSE return
(Return - EW Return) for each portfolio. The last row reports the mean difference between
the high and low portfolios (H-L) for each variable.The statistical significance reported in the
last row is computed from a paired t-test estimated from the time series of the difference
between the high and the low institutional imbalance portfolios. The statistical significance
reported in the first 10 rows are computed from a paired t-test estimated from the time series
of the difference between the corresponding portfolio return and the mean across all 10 portfolios.
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0
Rank Return − EW Return Instit.Buy − Instit.Sell
D1 −0.090a −0.116a −0.166a −0.266a −0.506a −0.611a −0.045a −0.053a −0.066a −0.086a −0.135a −0.320a
D2 −0.019 −0.037 −0.058a −0.118a −0.248a −0.373a −0.015a −0.017a −0.021a −0.026a −0.038a −0.074a
D3 −0.003 −0.003 −0.015 −0.059a −0.129a −0.240a −0.006a −0.008a −0.009a −0.012a −0.016a −0.030a
D4 0.006 −0.002 −0.001 −0.017 −0.063a −0.135a −0.002a −0.003a −0.004a −0.004a −0.006a −0.010a
D5 0.004 0.002 0.000 −0.002 −0.023 −0.052a −0.000a −0.000a −0.000a −0.001a −0.001a −0.001a
D6 0.004 −0.010 0.009 0.001 0.028b 0.012a 0.001 0.001a 0.002 0.002 0.003b 0.004a
D7 −0.001 0.007 0.009 0.037a 0.075a 0.088a 0.005a 0.006a 0.006a 0.007a 0.009a 0.014a
D8 −0.002 0.019 0.024b 0.055a 0.139a 0.209a 0.010a 0.011a 0.013a 0.016a 0.021a 0.035a
D9 0.001 0.024b 0.048a 0.109a 0.239a 0.363a 0.020a 0.024a 0.027a 0.032a 0.045a 0.080a
D10 −0.021 0.001 0.036b 0.144a 0.378a 0.626a 0.053a 0.058a 0.070a 0.091a 0.138a 0.324a
H-L 0.069a 0.117a 0.202a 0.411a 0.884a 1.237a 0.098a 0.111a 0.136a 0.177a 0.273a 0.644a
a Significance at 1%.
b Significance at 5%.
4.3.5 Institutional Trading and Return Sort
To investigate whether institutions trade on the prior day’s returns, I follow Griffin et al. (2003)
and sort firms into ten portfolios according to their daily return performance and then examine
institutional buy-sell imbalances on the subsequent day. For each day−decile I compute the fraction
of institutions that are net buyers in a stock which are displayed in Figure 4.1. Stocks in the decile
experiencing the highest daily returns exhibit net buying by institutions more than net selling on
the next day 59.8 percent of the time. On the other hand, stocks in the decile experiencing the
lowest daily stock returns are bought by institutions in the following day for only 46.2 percent of
the stocks. Figure 4.1 shows that institutional investors are 13.6 percent (59.8%−46.2%) net buyers
in stocks experiencing large prior day returns in comparison to those with low prior day returns.
These findings are smaller than those documented by Griffin et al. (2003) who find that institutional
investors are 23.9 percent more likely to be net buyers in Nasdaq 100 stocks that have experienced
large prior day performance relative to those with low prior day performance. In unreported results,
sub−sample analysis show that the fraction of institutions that are net buyers in top decile stocks
relative to bottom decile stocks does not change neither over time nor in sub−samples based on firm
characteristics such as size or liquidity. These findings suggest that the short−term institutional
momentum trading is weaker than that documented in Griffin et al. (2003).
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On each day, the sample of stocks are sorted by the prior day’s return and assigned to one of ten
deciles. For each decile, the proportion of stocks for which institutions are net buyers the following day is
calculated. The time series average of these proportions is computed for each decile on the day following
the ranking day.
Figure 4.1: Institutional trading activity following ranking by daily returns
Prior studies document a considerable time variation in momentum profits due to either market
state, investor sentiment, or the realized volatility of the market (e.g., Chordia and Shivakumar,
2002; Cooper et al., 2004; Wang and Xu, 2010). Therefore, I also examine how institutional trading
following prior day’s returns develops over time for both winner and loser portfolios. Figure 4.2
depicts the cross−sectional average of institutional imbalances for both winner and loser portfolios
in the day following the portfolio formation. As can be seen, there is a notable time variation in
institutional trading for both loser and winner portfolios, however, after 2004 the time variation in
the loser stocks is stronger than that in the winners. Figure 4.3 displays the difference in institutional
demand between winner and loser stocks over the sample period. There is a notable time variation
in the degree of momentum trading by institutions, such that, it is positive during the whole sample
period, we don’t observe any considerable contrarian trading by institutions, and the institutional
momentum trading has increased rapidly in the first half of the sample.
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On each day, the sample of stocks are sorted by the prior day’s return and assigned to one of ten deciles.
The Figure displays the cross−sectional average of institutional imbalances for both winner and loser
portfolios.
Figure 4.2: Institutional trading activity for winner and loser portfolios
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On each day, the sample of stocks are sorted by the prior day’s return and assigned to one of ten deciles.
The Figure displays the differences in institutional imbalances for both winner and loser portfolios.
Figure 4.3: Difference in institutional demand for winner and loser portfolios
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To further examine the relationship between institutional buy−sell imbalances and previous day’s
returns, extreme winner and loser portfolios (based on the prior day’s return) are ranked into quin-
tile based on the subsequent day institutional buy−sell imbalance. Panel A in Table 4.3 reports the
time-series mean of the cross-sectional averages of the subsequent day institutional imbalances and
abnormal returns for the stocks in the top daily return decile (winners). Results show a strong rela-
tionship between institutional imbalances and returns in the day following portfolio formation. The
quintile of winners experiencing the largest next day institutional net selling activity exhibits strong
return reversals− abnormal returns average −0.525 percent in the day following portfolio formation,
statistically significant at one percent level. Alternatively, the quintile of winners experiencing the
largest subsequent day institutional net buying exhibit strong momentum−abnormal returns average
0.733 percent in the day following the portfolio formation, again statistically significant at the one
percent level. Panel B presents similar results for decile of losers divided into following institutional
buy−sell imbalances quintile. In sum, these results suggest that institutions are short-term momen-
tum traders and there is a strong positive relation between institutional trading activity and level of
return momentum.
Table 4.3: Institutional Buy−Sell Imbalances and Return Sort
Each day a sample of NASDAQ-AMEX-NYSE stocks are sorted into ten portfolios based
on daily raw return. Panel A presents the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean
subsequent day institutional buy−sell imbalance and abnormal returns for stocks in the top
daily return decile (winners) ranked into subsequent day institutional buy−sell imbalance
quintiles. Similarly, Panel B presents the data for losers decile ranked into subsequent day
institutional buy−sell imbalance quintile. F−statistic is based on the null hypothesis that the
time-series averages of cross−sectional means do not differs across the portfolios. t−statistic
between paracenteses.
Subsequent Subsequent
Selling 2 3 4 Buying
Panel A: Winners Ranked by Subsequent Institutional Imbalance F -statistic
Subsequent Abnormal Returns −0.525 −0.328 −0.149 0.189 0.733 2055∗∗∗
(−17.69)∗∗∗ (−13.59)∗∗∗ (−6.43)∗∗∗ (7.62)∗∗∗ (24.62)∗∗∗
Institutional Imbalance −0.205 −0.015 0.010 0.058 0.333 2059∗∗∗
Panel B: Losers Ranked by Subsequent Institutional imbalances
Subsequent Abnormal Returns −0.702 −0.143 0.187 0.397 0.637 1748∗∗∗
(−21.17)∗∗∗ (−5.41)∗∗∗ (7.12)∗∗∗ (13.88)∗∗∗ (18.09)∗∗∗
Institutional Imbalance −0.344 −0.050 −0.005 0.025 0.260 1759∗∗∗
4.3.6 Vector Autoregression
The primary objective of the chapter is to investigate the relation between returns and institutional
trading activity. Inferences about this relationship are potentially influenced by the time−series
properties of each variable. Specifically, institutional imbalances are strongly related to past institu-
tional imbalances (Sias and Starks, 1997; Griffin et al., 2003), and institutional trading is dependent
on past returns (Grinblatt et al., 1995; Wermers, 1999; Griffin et al., 2003). Therefore, to examine
whether institutional trades lead returns or returns lead institutional trades I follow Griffin et al.
(2003) and use vector autoregression to investigate the time-series behavior of institutional trading
activity and returns at daily level. For each stock in the sample, I compute the daily institutional im-
balances and returns, and then deduct from both variables an equally weighted average institutional
imbalance or return, respectively, to minimize market wide-effects. To simplify the interpretation of
our results, the two variables are standardized (to have a zero mean and standard deviation of one)
using their time series moments. Then, for each stock the following system of equations is estimated:
4.3. Returns and Institutional Trading Relation 66
Rt = α+
5∑
j=1
βjRt−j +
5∑
j=1
γjIimbalt−j + εt,R (4.2)
Iimbalt = α+
5∑
j=1
βjRt−j +
5∑
j=1
γjIimbalt−j + εt,Iimbal (4.3)
where Rt is the adjusted stock return on day t and Iimbalt is the adjusted institutional trading
imbalance on day t.
Cross-sectional average of the estimated loadings from equation (4.2) and (4.3), the percentage
of securities with positive and negative estimates that are significant at conventional level, and
the adjusted R-squares are reported in Table 4.4. Panel A of Table 4.4 reveals several interesting
patterns. First, in equation (4.3) the cross-sectional average of estimated coefficients of the prior
day’s return is 0.04, suggesting that a one standard deviation increase in the day t− 1 return leads
to a 0.04 standard deviation increase in the net buying activity of institutions in day t. Moreover,
27 percent of the stocks have positive and significant coefficients at five percent level. However, the
effect disappears with the 2−through 5−day lagged coefficients being either small or slightly negative.
Griffin et al. (2003) use vector autoregression for 82 stocks that are member of Nasdaq 100 and find
that a one standard deviation increase in the daily return leads to a 0.12 increase in the following day
institutional net buying, and 34 percent of stocks have positive and significant coefficients. Second,
abnormal institutional trading activity is highly autocorrelated with prior day institutional activity.
The cross−sectional average coefficient on the previous day institutional buy−sell imbalance is 0.27
and more than 89 percent of the loadings are positive and statistically different from zero at five
percent level. The lagged 2− through 5−day institutional buy−sell imbalance estimates are positive
as well. These daily findings are in line with those found in Sias and Starks (1997) and Griffin et al.
(2003) who find that there is strong persistence in the U.S. institutional investors trading activity.
However, these results reveal a stronger persistence in institutional buy−sell imbalances compared to
those documented in Griffin et al. (2003); probably due to that, our measure of institutional trading
variable is a better proxy. Third, there is no evidence that institutional traders predict the next day
returns. In the return equation of Panel, A in Table 4.4, the cross-sectional average coefficients for
past institutional imbalances are close to zero, and approximately four percent of the stocks have
positive coefficients that are statistically different from zero at five percent confidence level.
Table 4.4, Panel B, reports the results obtained from estimating a structural vector autoregression
by including the contemporaneous returns in the institutional trading equation.1 The results show a
strong contemporaneous relationship between institutional buy-sell imbalances and returns; the cross-
sectional average coefficients for the contemporaneous return is 0.12, indicating that a one standard
deviation increase in day t return is associated with a 0.12 standard deviation increase in day t
institutional net buying activity. More than 56 percent of stocks have significant positive coefficients
at the five percent level and the average adjusted R2 for the imbalance equation has increased from
0.13 to 0.16. It is interesting to note that the average coefficient on the past day return is unchanged
and the percentage of positive significant coefficients increases from 27.18 percent to 28.84 percent.2
The strong positive relation between daily institutional imbalances and daily returns is consistent
with institutional investors ability to predict intradaily price movements, institutional investors follow
intradaily prices, or institutional price pressure. To distinguish between these competing hypotheses,
1I add the contemporaneous return to measure the contemporaneous effect on institutional imbalances relative to
the impact of prior day’s return. I obtain similar strong relationship by including the contemporaneous institutional
imbalances in the return equation.
2Griffin et al. (2003) document average coefficient for the contemporaneous return for 82 stock of Nasdaq 100 of
0.52 and all stocks have significant positive coefficients.
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I examine the relation between institutional imbalances and returns at intradaily level in section 4.5.
Table 4.4: Daily VAR Estimates for Individual Stocks
This table reports the main results for the equations (3.2) and (3.3) in the main text. Both
variables, returns and institutional imbalances, are adjusted by subtracting the equal-weighted
average for the stocks comprising the Nasdaq-Amex-NYSE for the corresponding day. For
each stock, the institutional buy-sell imbalance is the difference between the institutional buy
and sell volumes for that day divided by the total number of outstanding shares. To facilitate
interpretation, both variables are standardized prior to estimation of the VAR. The main results
are reported in Panel A. Panel B reports results for a structural VAR with contemporaneous
excess returns in the institutional imbalance equation. This table reports the cross-sectional
averages of the coefficient estimates, the adjusted R2s, the percentage of stocks with positive
and negative coefficients that are significant at the 5% confidence level (% pos.sig. and %
neg.sig.).
Panel A Panel B
Return Iimbal Iimbal
Coeff % pos.sig. % neg.sig. Coeff % pos.sig. % neg.sig. Coeff % pos.sig. % neg.sig.
α 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
R
et
u
rn
β0 0.12 56.54 0.68
β1 −0.02 3.75 12.32 0.04 27.18 0.85 0.04 28.84 0.64
β2 −0.02 2.50 8.30 0.01 5.80 2.30 0.01 6.32 2.05
β3 −0.01 2.58 4.07 0.00 3.34 2.94 0.00 3.75 2.74
β4 −0.01 1.57 3.66 0.00 2.58 3.42 0.00 2.74 3.22
β5 −0.01 1.41 4.43 0.00 2.22 3.58 0.04 2.54 3.54
Ii
m
b
a
l
γ1 0.00 3.71 3.46 0.27 89.65 0.00 0.27 89.93 0.00
γ2 0.00 3.50 3.02 0.07 38.66 0.56 0.07 39.23 0.52
γ3 0.00 3.26 3.66 0.05 24.45 0.44 0.05 24.73 0.56
γ4 0.00 3.58 4.03 0.03 14.78 0.77 0.03 14.78 0.85
γ5 0.00 3.75 3.34 0.04 18.45 0.48 0.04 19.13 0.40
Adj.R2 0.008 0.13 0.160
4.3.7 Buying Winners or Selling Losers
Momentum trading strategy is based on buying past winners and selling past losers. In the context
of this study, an equally important question is whether institutional investors’ trading activity differs
between loser and winner portfolios. To answer this question, I perform for each stock a piecewise
linear regression with the median return as a knot, as follow:
Iimbalt = α+
5∑
j=0
βjRL,t−j +
5∑
j=0
γjRW,t−j +
5∑
j=1
λjIimbalt−j + εt,Iimbal (4.4)
where RL,t = min(Rt, R˜t) is the return on loser stocks on day t, RW,t = max(Rt − R˜t, 0) is the
return on winner stocks, Rt is the daily stock return, R˜t is the daily cross−sectional median returns,
and Iimbalt is the adjusted institutional trading imbalance on day t. The piecewise linear regression
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that has been widely used in the flow−performance literature (Sirri and Tufano, 1998) allow us to
compute two different regression loads for the return variable. One of the estimated coefficients refers
to the slope of the segment above the cross−sectional median return (winner stocks), whereas the
other estimated coefficient refers to the slope of the segment below the cross−sectional median (loser
stocks). A positive relation between institutional imbalances and returns above (below) the median
indicates that institutional investors tend to buy winners (sell losers) on average.
Results of equation (4.4) are presented in Table 4.5. Coefficients on the variable Iimbal are
not reported for brevity. Panel A reports the results of full sample, whereas Panel B presents the
sub−samples partitioned by time. The results of the full sample analysis reveal notable differences
in the trading patterns of institutional investors between loser and winner stocks.
Table 4.5: Differences in Institutional Trading among Winners and Losers
This table reports the estimation results for equation (3.4) in the main text. All variables
are adjusted by subtracting the equal-weighted average for the stocks comprising the Nasdaq-
Amex-NYSE for the corresponding day. For each stock, the institutional buy-sell imbalance is
the difference between the institutional buy and sell volumes for that day divided by the total
number of outstanding shares. To facilitate interpretation, all variables are standardized. Panel
A reports results for the full sample analysis. Panel B reports the results of sub-period samples.
This table reports the cross-sectional averages of the coefficient estimates and adjusted R2s,
the percentage of stocks with positive and negative coefficients that are significant at the 5%
confidence level (% pos.sig. and % neg.sig.).
Losers Winners
Dep.Var α β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 Adj.R
2
Panel A: Full Sample
Iimbal 0.00 0.15 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.17
pos.sig. 7.3% 60.6% 22.1% 7.4% 6.4% 5.2% 4.5% 51.6% 28.4% 8.7% 5.0% 4.7% 4.3%
neg.sig. 6.2% 5.3% 7.5% 8.7% 7.0% 6.2% 6.0% 6.6% 2.6% 4.0% 3.4% 4.1% 3.8%
Panel B: Sub-sample
1999-2000
Iimbal 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19
pos.sig. 4.8% 31.0% 16.0% 6.6% 5.4% 5.4% 3.4% 29.2% 19.4% 5.6% 2.6% 3.4% 2.2%
neg.sig. 5.8% 8.2% 5.0% 4.6% 6.4% 3.2% 2.4% 5.2% 2.6% 2.8% 3.2% 3.0% 4.4%
2001-2002
Iimbal -0.03 0.08 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.17
pos.sig. 3.7% 37.2% 10.8% 4.9% 4.4% 4.4% 3.2% 33.9% 22.3% 6.4% 2.7% 1.4% 2.2%
neg.sig. 9.4% 7.2% 7.5% 7.6% 6.2% 3.7% 4.6% 3.7% 1.5% 2.3% 2.8% 3.7% 3.9%
2003-2004
Iimbal 0.02 0.19 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.19
pos.sig. 7.7% 43.2% 16.8% 5.7% 4.6% 3.9% 3.0% 33.8% 15.8% 4.6% 4.7% 3.6% 2.7%
neg.sig. 4.0% 5.1% 6.4% 4.3% 4.1% 4.4% 3.9% 6.4% 1.9% 3.4% 2.9% 3.9% 3.2%
2005-2006
Iimbal 0.01 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.22
pos.sig. 7.5% 50.3% 18.2% 7.0% 4.9% 3.9% 4.1% 39.1% 19.7% 6.4% 4.9% 4.4% 3.2%
neg.sig. 4.1% 6.0% 5.2% 3.8% 5.0% 4.8% 4.3% 7.9% 2.6% 3.5% 2.3% 4.8% 4.3%
2007-2009
Iimbal 0.00 0.17 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.18
pos.sig. 6.8% 57.5% 15.9% 6.9% 5.8% 4.7% 3.8% 49.4% 21.3% 7.8% 3.9% 3.7% 3.5%
neg.sig. 6.8% 4.0% 6.2% 6.7% 5.8% 5.4% 5.5% 6.0% 2.3% 4.2% 3.2% 3.5% 3.2%
2010-2011
Iimbal -0.01 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.19
pos.sig. 4.9% 45.9% 13.5% 7.2% 5.1% 4.7% 3.5% 47.4% 16.7% 5.3% 4.0% 3.5% 3.7%
neg.sig. 6.5% 5.0% 5.0% 4.8% 4.0% 3.8% 3.8% 5.8% 2.1% 3.3% 3.1% 3.0% 4.1%
Contemporaneously, institutions tend to sell losers more often than buying winners. The cross-
sectional average of the estimated coefficients on the loser portfolio is 0.15 and 60% of the securities
have positive and significant coefficients at five percent level, whereas the cross−sectional average
estimates on the winner portfolio is 0.09 and 51% of the stocks have positive and significant estimates
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at five percent level. On the other hand, institutions are momentum traders in both winner and loser
stocks, however, they tend to buy prior day’s winners more often than selling prior day’s losers. The
cross−sectional average coefficients on the winners is 0.05 and 28% of the stocks have positive and
significant estimates at five percent level, whereas the cross−sectional coefficients on the losers is
0.03 and only 22% of the coefficients are positive and significant at five percent level.
The sub−period analysis shows similar trading patterns. Institutions tend to sell stocks ex-
periencing poor performance (below the cross−sectional median) more often than buying stocks
experiencing strong performance of the same day in all sub−periods except for the most recent one.
Moreover, institutions tend to buy prior day’s winners more often than selling prior day’s losers in
most of the sub−samples.
4.4 Robustness analysis
In this section, I investigate two potential explanations on what might be driving institutional trading
activity in the same direction of previous day returns. One possible explanation is that institutional
investors submit their orders based on the prior day price movements. Alternatively, it could be that
institutional investors split the large orders and work them over several trading days. Institutions
often break down the difficult orders to minimize the market impact costs of their trades. While it
might not be possible to completely separate out these competing views, I follow Griffin et al. (2003)
and test them in three different ways.
First, Griffin et al. (2003) argue that if institutional investors work orders over several days,
then one would expect these trades to be the result of large block orders. Hence, they examine
medium−size institutional trades to investigate whether institutional imbalances follow past returns.
Using the same strategy, I investigate whether our results survive for medium−size institutional
trades, that is, the analysis focuses on transactions where the number of shares is greater than
or equal to 500 and less than 10,000 shares. Panel A of Table 4.6 shows that the medium-size
institutional trades follow the prior day’s return, although, not with the same magnitude as shown
previously in Panel B of Table 4.4. A one standard deviation increase in the past day return leads
to a 0.03 standard deviation increase in daily net buying activity of institutional investors. There
are more than 19 percent of the firms with positive significant coefficients at the five percent level.
Institutional imbalances are related to past imbalances with only weak evidence of predictability in
daily returns. These findings are similar to those obtained by Griffin et al. (2003) who document that
a one standard deviation increase in the prior day’s returns leads to a 0.07 increase in medium−size
daily institutional trades and 23.2% of the firms have positive and significant coefficients at the five
percent level.
Second, since ANcerno data provide each transaction with the time stamp, I examine the relation-
ship between afternoon institutional transaction and previous days’ returns based on the argument
provided by Griffin et al. (2003). According to these authors, institutional orders executed over
several trading days may occur if institutions submit large orders near the closing hour, therefore,
it is more likely that these orders will not be fully filled the same day but rather in the morning
of the next day. More specifically, I use institutional transactions executed after 12:00 O’clock to
examine this potential explanations. The results presented in Panel B of Table 4.6 suggest that
our findings are not entirely driven by large institutional orders taking long time to be filled, but
rather from institutional trades following past returns. A one standard deviation increase in the past
day’s return is associated with a 0.04 standard deviation increase in today’s institutional net buying
activity. The return in the day preceding institutional activity is an important factor in forecasting
the afternoon’s institutional imbalances in 27.88 percent of the firms at the 5 percent level. Results
also show that the afternoon institutional imbalances are strongly related to the prior imbalances.
Griffin et al. (2003) find that a one standard deviation increase in the prior day’s returns leads to
0.12 standard deviation increase in the afternoon institutional imbalances and 31.7% of the stocks
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have positive and significant coefficients at five percent level.
Table 4.6: A Closer Examination of the Daily relation between Returns and Institutional
Trading Activity
For each of the stocks in the sample the following daily structural vector autoregressions (VARs)
with five lags are estimated:
Rt = α+
5∑
j=1
βiRt−i +
5∑
j=1
γiIimbalt−i + εt,R
Iimbalt = α+
5∑
j=0
βiRt−i +
5∑
j=1
γiIimbalt−i + εt,TI
where Rt is the daily adjusted return and Iimbalt is the daily adjusted institutional buy-sell
imbalance for a given stock. Both variables are adjusted by subtracting the equal-weighted
average for the stocks comprising the Nasdaq-Amex-NYSE for the corresponding day. For each
stock, the institutional buy-sell imbalance is the difference between the institutional buy and
sell volumes for that day divided by the total number of outstanding shares, where the buy and
sell volumes only include transactions that are greater than or equal to 500 and less than 10,000
shares. Applying these criteria the estimation results are base on 1466 stocks. Results for the
VAR are reported in Panel A. Next, the following regression is estimated:
Iimbal∗t = α+
5∑
j=1
βiRt−i +
5∑
j=1
γiIimbalt−i + εt,TI
where Iimbal∗(Iimbal) is the daily adjusted institutional buy-sell imbalance from 12:00 p.m.
to 4:00 p.m (for the whole day) for a given stock. For each stock, the institutional buy-sell
imbalance is the difference between the institutional buy and sell volumes from 12:00 p.m. to
4:00 p.m (for the whole day) divided by the total number of outstanding shares. Applying these
criteria the estimation results are based on 2378 stocks. Results for this regressions are reported
in Panel B. Panel C reports results for the 576 most active stocks with average trading volume
per year more or equal to 75 percentile across all stocks. To facilitate interpretation, both
variables are standardized prior to estimation of the VAR. This table reports the cross-sectional
averages of the coefficient estimates and adjusted R2s, the percentage of stocks with positive
and negative coefficients that are significantly different from 0 at the 5% confidence level (%
pos.sig. and % neg.sig.) are shown.
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Return Iimbal Iimbal Iimbal
Coeff %P.sig. %N.sig. Coeff %P.sig. %N.sig. Coeff %P.sig. %N.sig. Coeff %P.sig. %N.sig.
α 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89 −0.01 1.00 2.08
β0 0.09 46.59 1.16
β1 −0.02 3.75 9.48 0.03 19.44 1.02 0.04 27.88 0.67 0.04 27.78 1.04
β2 −0.02 2.39 8.53 0.00 4.02 3.14 0.01 6.85 2.23 0.00 3.82 3.99
β3 −0.01 1.64 5.32 0.00 2.80 4.23 0.00 3.45 3.07 0.00 3.13 3.30
β4 −0.01 1.64 4.64 0.00 3.21 4.37 0.00 3.07 2.94 0.00 2.26 5.38
β5 −0.01 1.64 5.32 0.00 2.11 4.09 0.00 2.52 3.78 -0.01 2.08 5.73
γ1 0.01 6.75 2.11 0.32 95.29 0.00 0.27 89.15 0.00 0.25 87.85 0.00
γ2 0.00 2.80 3.62 0.08 37.79 0.14 0.07 37.97 0.42 0.06 37.50 0.52
γ3 0.00 2.18 2.73 0.05 20.40 0.82 0.05 22.71 0.88 0.04 22.40 0.35
γ4 0.00 2.46 2.80 0.03 13.85 0.75 0.03 13.41 0.84 0.03 15.97 0.69
γ5 0.00 3.27 3.14 0.03 14.67 0.68 0.04 18.21 0.55 0.03 16.67 1.22
Adj.R2 0.01 0.20 0.13 0.12
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Finally, I also examine whether our findings survive for a sub−sample of the most active stocks;
I define active stocks as those that have an average trading volume per year higher than or equal
to the 75 percentile of the average trading volume across all institutions. It is reasonable to think
that institutional trend chasing may arise form the price impact of institutional trades. Therefore,
if our findings are driven by institutional trades moving prices and taking long time to clear, then
one should expect these patterns to be less severe in the most active stocks as they are extremely
liquid stocks. Panel C reveals that a one standard deviation increase in previous day return leads
to a 0.04 standard deviation increase in this afternoon’s institutional imbalances and 27.78 percent
of firms have positive significant coefficients at the five percent level. While it is not possible to rule
out all potential explanations on what might be deriving institutional trades in the same direction
of previous day’s returns, our daily evidence indicates that these patterns are in large part the
consequence of institutional orders being placed in the same direction of the price movements.
4.5 Intradaily Analysis
The strong daily contemporaneous relation between institutional imbalances and returns is consistent
with institutional investors following intradaily prices, the institutional price pressure hypothesis, and
institutional investors’ ability to predict intradaily price movements. In this section, I conduct an
intradaily analysis to examine the relation between returns and institutional imbalances to help dis-
tinguish between these competing explanations. More specifically, I investigate the relation between
institutional trade imbalances and intradaily jumps in prices.
To capture both positive and negative jumps in the intradaily prices, I define two dummy vari-
ables. The dummy variable pjump (njump, capturing the positive (negative) jump, equals one if
the change in the stock price is at least one standard deviations higher (lower) than the quarterly
average change in stock price, and equals zero otherwise. I also examine the relation for larger jumps
by considering a 1.5 and a 2 standard deviation jumps. To limit our sample and obtain the necessary
data, I require at least five observations for each stock in each day. For the jump events, I require
the time difference between the two consecutive price observations to be of maximum 60 minutes.
I compute institutional buy-sell imbalances by considering two time intervals after a jump event,
one-hour as well as two-hours interval after the jump occurs, with this framework, I estimate the
following regression:
Imbali,t = α+ βpPjumpi,t−1 + βnNjumpi,t−1 + γControls+ εi,t (4.5)
where Pjump and Njump are dummy variables capturing the positive and negative jumps, respec-
tively, Imbal measures the institutional imbalances. I also control for other stock characteristics such
as prior-hour return, stock turnover, absolute return to proxy for stock volatility, firm size, bid-ask
spread, and the previous day return.
A positive (negative) relationship between institutional imbalances and Pjump (Njump) implies
that institutional investors follow intradaily stock prices and this in turn may induce the positive
contemporaneous relation between returns and institutional imbalances at daily level. Table 4.7
reports the regression results of equation (4.5) for each of the years in our sample; the regressions
include firm fixed effects and monthly time dummies. In the left part of Table 4.7, institutional
imbalances are computed within one-hour interval after the jump event, while in the right part,
institutional trades are computed within two-hours interval. The empirical results reveal that there
is a strong positive relation between institutional imbalances and positive jumps, in particular, for
the most recent years, the relation holds for all jump sizes and for the different ways the institu-
tional trades are computed (either one-hour or two-hours interval). For example, the coefficients on
pjump are positive and significant at conventional levels for all sub−samples after 2002, suggesting
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that institutions increase their net buying activity after large increase in prices at intradaily level.
However, the relation between institutional imbalances and negative jumps is insignificant except for
some sub−samples of the very recent years. For example, for 1σ the coefficient on njump is negative
and significant at conventional levels only for the 2009 when computing institutional imbalances in
one-hour interval and it is negative and significant at conventional levels from 2009 through 2011.
For 1.5σ the coefficient on the negative jump is significant only in 2009 and 2010.
These findings provide some evidence in favor of institutional trend chasing at intradaily fre-
quency. Institutions react faster and more often to positive jumps than to negative ones, and con-
sequently they increase their stock holding after a positive jump and less often decrease their stock
holding after the negative ones. These results are similar to those obtained by Griffin et al. (2003)
who investigate the intradaily relationship between institutional imbalances and returns measured at
5−minutes intervals using vector autoregression analysis as well as by examining both institutional
imbalances and returns around extreme institutional trading and return events. Their main findings
suggest that institutional imbalances follow past prices at intradaily level and the institutional price
impact is minimal.
Table 4.7: An Intradaily Analysis for Institutional Momentum Trading
This Table reports the regression results of the intradaily institutional imbalances against jumps
in stock prices. Institutional imbalance is defined as the difference between the institutional
buy and sell volumes for that day divided by the total number of outstanding shares, Pjump
(Njump) is a dummy variable capturing the intradaily positive (negative) jumps in prices.
I consider three jump sizes, a 1σ, 1.5σ, and 2σ. Institutional imbalances are calculated
considering two time intervals, a one-hour and two-hours after the jump event. The regressions
include firm fixed effects and monthly time dummies. t−statistic in parenthesis.
One Hour Two Hours
1 σ 1.5 σ 2 σ 1 σ 1.5 σ 2 σ
Pjump Njump Pjump Njump Pjump Njump Pjump Njump Pjump Njump Pjump Njump
99 0.00001 0.00002 0.00000 0.00001 -0.00013 -0.00001 0.00001 0.00000 -0.00008 -0.00007 -0.00013 -0.00001
(0.34) (0.44) (-0.01) (0.17) (-1.75) (-0.11) (0.18) (0.09) (-1.24) (-1.01) (-1.75) (-0.11)
00 0.00010 -0.00003 0.00020 -0.00005 0.00032 -0.00015 0.00011 -0.00008 0.00018 -0.00016 0.00032 -0.00015
(1.68) (-0.51) (2.29) (-0.61) (2.56) (-1.15) (1.42) (-1.05) (1.65) (-1.47) (2.56) (-1.15)
01 0.00006 0.00007 -0.00004 -0.00002 0.00000 -0.00003 0.00016 0.00029 -0.00005 0.00012 0.00000 -0.00003
(0.33) (0.39) (-0.92) (-0.46) (0.01) (-0.60) (0.69) (1.22) (-0.6) (1.4) (0.01) (-0.6)
02 0.00004 0.00002 0.00001 0.00005 0.00004 0.00005 0.00005 0.00002 0.00009 0.00006 0.00004 0.00005
(1.89) (1.31) (0.39) (1.86) (1.29) (1.48) (2.13) (0.65) (2.38) (1.59) (1.29) (1.48)
03 0.00003 0.00001 0.00004 0.00000 0.00004 0.00000 0.00003 0.00000 0.00005 -0.00001 0.00004 0.00000
(3.38) (1.31) (2.80) (-0.18) (2.06) (-0.2) (2.58) (0.02) (3.43) (-0.42) (2.06) (-0.2)
04 0.00004 0.00002 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00002 0.00007 0.00001 0.00006 0.00006 0.00005 0.00002
(2.09) (1.05) (2.03) (1.82) (1.47) (0.52) (2.71) (0.34) (1.67) (1.49) (1.47) (0.52)
05 0.00003 0.00001 0.00004 0.00001 0.00004 0.00000 0.00004 0.00002 0.00007 0.00003 0.00004 0.00000
(3.41) (1.28) (3.65) (1.44) (3.09) (-0.04) (3.92) (1.7) (4.72) (1.76) (3.09) (-0.04)
06 0.00003 0.00000 0.00004 0.00001 0.00004 0.00002 0.00003 0.00000 0.00005 0.00001 0.00004 0.00002
(4.37) (0.60) (4.31) (1.13) (2.99) (1.53) (3.51) (0.2) (5.01) (0.94) (2.99) (1.53)
07 0.00006 0.00000 0.00007 0.00000 0.00007 0.00000 0.00006 0.00001 0.00009 0.00002 0.00007 0.00000
(5.29) (0.00) (4.90) (-0.19) (3.77) (-0.03) (4.6) (0.47) (5.97) (1.07) (3.77) (-0.03)
08 0.00002 0.00000 0.00003 0.00001 0.00004 0.00001 0.00003 -0.00001 0.00005 0.00001 0.00004 0.00001
(3.02) (0.25) (3.34) (1.12) (2.82) (1.11) (3.02) (-0.52) (3.95) (0.6) (2.82) (1.11)
09 0.00003 -0.00001 0.00004 -0.00001 0.00005 -0.00002 0.00004 -0.00003 0.00006 -0.00003 0.00005 -0.00002
(8.78) (-3.66) (8.90) (-3.19) (7.89) (-2.64) (7.17) (-5.12) (8.76) (-4.43) (7.89) (-2.64)
10 0.00004 0.00000 0.00005 -0.00001 0.00006 0.00000 0.00005 -0.00002 0.00006 -0.00003 0.00006 0.00000
(10.48) (-0.66) (10.39) (-1.18) (9.29) (0.29) (9.27) (-3.4) (9.08) (-4.86) (9.29) (0.29)
11 0.00003 0.00000 0.00004 0.00000 0.00006 0.00000 0.00003 -0.00002 0.00005 -0.00001 0.00006 0.00000
(8.53) (-0.65) (8.70) (0.47) (9.03) (-0.44) (7.02) (-3.48) (7.58) (-1.45) (9.03) (-0.44)
Next, I examine the intradaily returns predictability of institutional imbalances. While the jump
events are defined as previously, the institutional imbalances are computed in one hour and two
hours interval before the jump takes place. A positive (negative) relation between lagged institu-
tional imbalances and pjump (njump) indicate to the ability of institutional investors to predict the
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intradaily price movements. To examine this hypothesis, I estimate the following two equations:
Pjumpi,t = α+ βpImbali,t−1 + γControls+ εi,t (4.6)
Njumpi,t = α+ βnImbali,t−1 + γControls+ εi,t (4.7)
The results of these two equations are presented in Table 4.8. The left part of Table 4.8 presents
the results of yearly sub−samples for the negative jumps, whereas the right part presents the results
for the positive jumps. These regressions include both firm fixed effects and monthly time dum-
mies. The empirical results suggest that there is no evidence on the intradaily institutional returns
predictability. The relationship between the lagged institutional imbalances and negative jumps is
positive and significant at conventional levels in the most of the yearly sub−samples, whereas the re-
lation between positive jumps and lagged institutional imbalances is mixed. These findings contrast
those obtained in Griffin et al. (2003) who find an economically small but statistically significant
intradaily return predictability for lagged institutional imbalances.
Table 4.8: An Intradaily Analysis for Institutional Return Predictability
This Table reports the intradaily regression results of positive (negative) jumps on institutional
imbalances. Institutional imbalance is defined as the difference between the institutional buy
and sell volumes for that day divided by the total number of outstanding shares, Pjump
(Njump) is a dummy variable capturing the intradaily positive (negative) jumps in prices.
I consider three jump sizes, a 1σ, 1.5σ, and 2σ. Institutional imbalances are calculated
considering two time intervals, one-hour and two-hours before the jump event. The regressions
include firm fixed effects and monthly time dummies. t−statistic in parenthesis.
One Hours Two Hours One Hours Two Hours
Njump Pjump
1 σ 1.5 σ 2 σ 1 σ 1.5 σ 2 σ 1 σ 1.5 σ 2 σ 1 σ 1.5 σ 2 σ
1999 -5.052 -0.470 -0.021 -0.153 0.084 0.326 -7.280 -3.668 -3.462 -0.301 -0.336 -0.275
(-1.6) (-0.28) (-0.01) (-0.18) (0.12) (0.53) (-1.72) (-1.74) (-2.05) (-0.37) (-0.46) (-0.45)
2000 0.501 1.630 0.955 1.094 0.580 0.301 -0.617 0.714 0.324 -0.220 0.022 0.014
(0.43) (2.33) (1.64) (2.67) (1.36) (0.83) (-0.51) (1.16) (0.63) (-0.65) (0.07) (0.05)
2001 0.025 0.036 0.028 0.043 0.047 0.032 0.203 0.039 0.031 0.083 0.059 0.040
(0.31) (0.63) (0.61) (0.62) (0.78) (0.65) (0.43) (0.68) (0.69) (1.16) (0.98) (0.81)
2002 0.635 0.661 0.730 0.885 0.982 0.994 0.594 0.544 0.670 0.639 0.570 0.637
(1.09) (2.25) (2.97) (2.63) (3.34) (3.93) (1.14) (1.8) (2.65) (1.92) (1.93) (2.48)
2003 0.760 0.635 0.774 0.744 0.681 0.836 0.279 0.484 0.608 0.227 0.468 0.698
(1.51) (2.18) (3.21) (2.1) (2.1) (3.03) (0.56) (1.63) (2.54) (0.64) (1.44) (2.53)
2004 -0.070 0.084 0.132 0.104 0.195 0.236 0.412 0.326 0.283 0.133 0.099 0.052
(-0.43) (0.83) (1.61) (0.86) (1.81) (2.61) (2.71) (3.27) (3.49) (1.12) (0.94) (0.58)
2005 0.774 0.571 0.644 0.298 0.202 0.601 1.019 0.420 0.454 0.504 0.386 0.338
(1.65) (2.26) (3.14) (1.99) (1.53) (2.97) (2.41) (1.7) (2.03) (1.78) (1.53) (1.49)
2006 0.572 0.682 0.770 0.451 0.751 0.824 0.108 0.261 0.248 0.037 0.136 0.242
(1.83) (3.49) (4.86) (2.03) (3.36) (4.3) (0.34) (1.31) (1.54) (0.16) (0.66) (1.38)
2007 0.768 0.563 0.459 0.687 0.687 0.602 -0.025 0.132 0.042 -0.056 0.099 0.063
(3.3) (3.59) (3.62) (3.99) (4) (4.08) (-0.11) (0.85) (0.34) (-0.32) (0.6) (0.44)
2008 1.665 1.170 0.909 1.461 1.469 1.212 -0.066 0.197 0.242 -0.148 0.238 0.444
(7.33) (7.95) (7.59) (7.79) (8.66) (8.29) (-0.31) (1.29) (1.94) (-0.88) (1.43) (3.05)
2009 3.908 2.245 1.761 2.460 2.088 1.614 -2.473 -1.092 -0.720 -2.148 -1.423 -0.934
(7.2) (7.19) (6.99) (7.5) (7.02) (6.35) (-4.48) (-3.54) (-2.88) (-6.79) (-4.88) (-3.7)
2010 3.881 2.773 2.409 3.419 3.016 2.807 -1.313 -0.213 -0.231 -2.290 -1.488 -1.133
(6.86) (7.54) (8.07) (7.81) (7.59) (8.14) (-2.36) (-0.58) (-0.78) (-5.25) (-3.73) (-3.32)
2011 4.452 4.127 3.204 4.799 5.185 4.233 -1.130 -0.301 -0.146 -1.627 -0.900 -0.159
(5.47) (8.07) (7.7) (7.45) (8.95) (8.49) (-1.41) (-0.59) (-0.35) (-2.61) (-1.55) (-0.32)
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In sum, the intradaily analysis suggest that the daily contemporaneous relation between institu-
tional imbalances and returns is mainly driven by institutions following intradaily prices. There are
two possible explanation for these intradaily results. First, prices may move in the same direction of
institutional trades either because institutions trade on common information or simply because in-
stitutions follow past prices. Alternatively, these findings are also consistent withe the price pressure
hypothesis. For example, if institutions submit a buy order and then, in an attempt to accumulate
the required number of shares, the market makers may bid up the prices before executing the trade.
The overall results suggest that there is no evidence on institutional investors’ ability to predict
intraday returns.
4.6 Post Ranking Returns and Price Reversal
DeLong et al. (1990) note that trading activity by the feedback traders can push prices beyond
fundamentals, thereby it may destabilize prices and threaten the efficiency of financial markets.
However, although herding and feedback trading could drive prices away from fundamentals, it may
also drive prices towards fundamentals if the information inferred from the trade of others is useful
(Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Hong and Stein, 1999; Hirshleifer et al., 1994)
Examining the deviation of prices from the fundamental value is not an easy task. I follow Grif-
fin et al. (2003) and test whether institutional trading have a destabilizing effect by investigating
post−formation returns. It is possible, for instance, that institutional orders move prices away from
fundamental values. If that is the case, return reversal will be observed as stock prices ultimately re-
vert toward fundamental values. Alternatively, the absence of subsequent price reversals is consistent
with the information hypothesis. However, return continuations in the days following the portfolio
formation may reflect institutional investors continuing to move prices away from fundamental val-
ues. In either case, whether return reversals or continuations indicate destabilizing behavior depends
on the time period considered Nofsinger and Sias (1999).
Table 4.9 reports the time−series average of the cross−sectional mean abnormal return for each
decile created according to institutional imbalances in the ten days following the formation day. I
find that in the two days following portfolio formation, the decile experiencing the largest institu-
tional selling activity exhibits small negative and insignificant returns, while the decile experiencing
the largest institutional buying activity exhibits small positive and insignificant returns. However,
although the return reversal in the third day after portfolio formation has the correct sign, the re-
turn differential between high and low institutional buy−sell imbalance deciles is insignificant. Thus,
these findings do not support the reversal hypothesis, one possible explanation is that, a longer time
horizon is necessary to make a clear inference.
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Table 4.9: Price Reversal and Post Ranking Returns
On each day the Nasdaq-Amex-NYSE stocks are ranked by their daily institutional buy-sell
imbalances and assigned to one of 10 portfolios. For each stock, institutional buy-sell imbalance
(expressed in percent) is the difference between the institutional buy and sell volumes for that
day scaled by the total number of outstanding shares. This table reports the contemporaneous
and post ranking returns. Returns are expressed in percent per day. The last row reports
the mean difference between the high and low portfolios for each variable. The statistical
significance reported in the last row is computed from a paired t-test estimated from the time
series of the difference between the high and the low portfolios.
Rank 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 +8 +9 +10
D1 −0.611 −0.005 −0.004 0.002 0.007 −0.010 −0.016 0.004 −0.001 −0.010 −0.009
D2 −0.373 −0.045 −0.016 −0.014 −0.023 −0.028 −0.012 −0.014 −0.015 −0.014 −0.007
D3 −0.240 −0.037 −0.025 −0.024 −0.021 −0.014 −0.018 −0.016 −0.015 −0.014 −0.016
D4 −0.135 −0.041 −0.026 −0.016 −0.016 −0.007 −0.011 −0.021 −0.001 −0.007 −0.020
D5 −0.052 −0.017 −0.023 −0.016 0.000 −0.004 0.000 −0.004 −0.010 −0.009 0.003
D6 0.012 −0.009 −0.005 −0.006 −0.008 0.003 −0.012 −0.008 −0.013 −0.004 −0.011
D7 0.088 −0.001 −0.014 −0.014 −0.015 −0.016 −0.011 −0.004 −0.009 −0.005 −0.016
D8 0.209 0.004 −0.003 −0.007 −0.005 −0.016 −0.012 −0.020 −0.018 −0.011 −0.005
D9 0.363 0.018 0.001 −0.013 −0.015 −0.006 −0.014 −0.016 −0.008 −0.013 −0.003
D10 0.626 0.020 0.002 −0.006 −0.016 −0.013 −0.010 −0.013 −0.021 −0.021 −0.028
H-L 1.237a 0.024 0.006 −0.008 −0.022 −0.003 0.006 −0.017 −0.020 −0.011 −0.020
a Significance at 1%.
b Significance at 5%.
4.7 Conclusions
I use proprietary institutional transaction data to examine the trading behavior for a sample of
institutional investors from January 1999 through September 2011. The paper provides empirical
evidence on (i) the cross-sectional relationship between institutional trading and contemporaneous
and prior day’s returns, and (ii) institutional investors’ ability to predict returns. I find strong
evidence that institutional trades follow past returns at daily level, the results being economically
and statistically significant. On the day subsequent to extreme return performance, institutional
investors are 13.6 percent more likely to be net buyers in stocks that are in the top decile of return
performance than those in bottom decile. Moreover, there is a strong positive contemporaneous
relationship between the trading activity of institutional investors and daily returns. The intradaily
analysis suggest that the contemporaneous relation found at a daily horizon is primarily driven
by institutions following the intradaily prices. In addition, I find no evidence that institutional
imbalances predict price movements. There is considerable time variation in the institutional trading
among loser and winner stocks. This result of daily institutional trades following past returns and the
persistence of institutional trades is robust to different trade-size classifications and methodologies.
A possible explanation for these patterns is that institutions observe return movements or firm’s
related information and trade accordingly, or due to institutional price impact, institutions move
prices in the direction of their trades. Similarly, I find that the afternoon institutional trades strongly
follow past return movements at a daily level, even for most active stocks. This suggests that our
findings are not specific to institutional order splitting. While there are likely several explanations
for our results, it appears that institutions view recent positive return movements or the information
related with them as a buying signal. Although the fact that institutional investors following past
returns may have a destabilizing influence, I find no evidence that institutional activity leads to price
reversals.
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